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Negligence, Economic Loss, and the U.C.C.
DAVID

B. GAEBLER*

INTRODUCTION

The traditional distinction between tort and contract has been that tort
deals with obligations imposed by law for the general benefit of society
while contract deals with obligations voluntarily assumed by the parties.'
This distinction has become blurred in a variety of areas with the result that
the law in those areas is often confusing and inconsistent. 2 The field of
products liability provides an excellent example of such an area,3 and, within
the field of products liability, no issue has been more subject to confusion
as a result of the doctrinal overlap of tort and contract than the problem
4
of economic loss resulting from defective products.

* A.B., 1970, Harvard Univ.; J.D., 1973, Univ. of Wisconsin; Assoc. Professor and Assoc.
Dean, Northern Illinois Univ.
1. "The law of torts enforces a set of obligations imposed by society for the common
good and which operate irrespective of individual consent. The law of contracts, on the other
hand, enforces the expectations created by bargained for promises that are voluntarily made."
Tort Theories in ComputerLitigation, 38 RPc. A.B. Crry N.Y. 426, 437 (1983); see W. KEETON,
D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 655, 656 (5th
ed. 1984) [hereinafter cited as PROSSER]; see also J. DooLY, MODERN TORT LAW § 2.06, at
13-14 (1977); G. GrMoRE, THE DEATm OF CONTRACT 87-90 (1974); S. SPEiSER, C. KRAUSE &
A. GANs, THE AmmCAN LAW OF TORTS § 1.20 (1983); Bertschy, Negligent Performance of
Service Contracts and the Economic Loss Doctrine, 17 J. MAR. L. REv. 249 (1984).
2. See PROSSER, supra note 1, at 655 (availability of both kinds of liability for the same
kind of loss has resulted in confusion and unnecessary complexity); see also G. GiiMoRE, supra
note 1, at 87-95; W. PROSSER, The Borderlandof Tort and Contract, in SELECTED Topics ON
THE LAw OF TORTS 380 (1953); Bertschy, supranote 1, at 252-53 (in the area of service contracts
outside of professional malpractice cases, "the law is tangled and ambiguous with respect to
tort responsibilities engendered by a contractual relationship"); Fridman, The Interaction of
Tort and Contract, 93 L.Q.R. 422, 436-37 (1977).
3. Dean Prosser, in describing the modern action for breach of warranty in the sale of
goods, spoke of the "peculiar and uncertain nature and character of warranty, a freak hybrid
born of the illicit intercourse of tort and contract." Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel
(Strict Liability to the Consumer), 69 YALE L.J. 1099, 1126 (1960); see also G. GILMORE, supra
note 1, at 92-93; Franklin, When Worlds Collide: Liability Theories and Disclaimersin Defective
Product Cases, 18 STAN. L. REv. 974 (1966); Fridman, supra note 2, at 436-37; Wade, Is
Section 401A of the Second Restatement of Torts Preempted by the UCC and Therefore
Unconstitutional?, 42 TENN. L. REv. 123, 126-29 (1974); Wade, Tort Liability for Products
Causing Physical Injury and Article 2 of the U.C.C., 48 Mo. L. REv. 1, 24-26 (1983).
4. See infra note 15.
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Most jurisdictions now recognize strict tort liability in products liability
cases.5 The majority of those jurisdictions, however, limit strict liability to
personal injury and physical property damage and do not impose strict
liability for purely economic losses. 6 Similarly, most courts refuse to recognize
a cause of action in negligence for purely economic losses in products liability
cases.7 Deprived of these tort remedies, a purchaser of a defective product

5. The first case to announce a general theory of strict tort liability in products cases was
Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963).
The following year the American Law Institute adopted the doctrine in section 402A of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts. As of June 1984, 36 states and the District of Columbia had
adopted § 402A and an additional ine states had adopted some variation of the doctrine.
1 PROD. LuB. REP. (CCH)
4018-4025 (1984); see also West v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 336
So. 2d 80, 87 n.l (Fla. 1976); 1 R. HURSH & H. BAILEY, AmERICA LAW OF PRODUCTS LIaBIrr
§ 4.41 (2d ed. 1974); PROSSER, supra note 1, at 694.
6. See, e.g., Purvis v. Consolidated Energy Prods. Co., 674 F.2d 217 (4th Cir. 1982)
(South Carolina law); Pennsylvania Glass Sand Corp. v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 652 F.2d
1165 (3d Cir. 1981) (Pennsylvania law); Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. v. Johns-Manville Sales
Corp., 626 F.2d 280 (3d Cir. 1980) (Illinois law); City of Clayton v. Grumman Emergency
Prods., 576 F. Supp. 1122 (E.D. Mo. 1983) (Missouri law); Copiers Typewriters Calculators,
Inc. v. Toshiba Corp., 576 F. Supp. 312 (D. Md. 1983) (Maryland law); Sioux City Community
School Dist. v. International Tel. & Tel. Corp., 461 F. Supp. 662 (N.D. Iowa 1978) (Iowa
law); Morrow v. New Moon Homes, 548 P.2d 279 (Alaska 1976); Rocky Mountain Fire &
Casualty Co. v. Biddulph Oldsmobile, 131 Ariz. 289, 640 P.2d 851 (1982); Seely v. White
Motors Co., 63 Cal. 2d 9, 402 P.2d 145, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17 (1965); Hiigel v. General Motors
Corp., 190 Colo. 57, 544 P.2d 983 (1975); Cedars of Lebanon Hosp. Corp. v. European Xray Distribs. of Am., Inc., 444 So. 2d 1068 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984); Henderson v. General
Motors Corp., 152 Ga. App. 63, 262 S.E.2d 238 (1979); Chrysler Corp. v. Taylor, 141 Ga.
App. 671, 234 S.E.2d 123 (1977); Moorman Mfg. Co. v. National Tank Co., 91 Ill. 2d 69,
435 N.E.2d 443 (1982); Superwood Corp. v. Siempelkamp Corp., 311 N.W.2d 159 (Minn.
1981); Forrest v. Chrysler Corp., 632 S.W.2d 29 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982); Clevenger & Wright
Co. v. A.O. Smith Harvester Prods., Inc., 625 S.W.2d 906 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981); National
Crane Corp. v. Ohio Steel Tube Co., 213 Neb. 782, 332 N.W.2d 39 (1983); Local Joint
Executive Bd. v. Stern, 98 Nev. 409, 651 P.2d 637 (1982); Schiavone Constr. Co. v. Elgood
Mayo Corp., 56 N.Y.2d 667, 436 N.E.2d 1322, 451 N.Y.S.2d 720 (1982); Mid-Hudson Mack,
Inc. v. Dutchess Quarry & Supply Co., 99 A.D.2d 751, 471 N.Y.S.2d 664 (1984); Price v.
Gatlin, 241 Or. 315, 405 P.2d 502 (1965); Nobility Homes, Inc. v. Shivers, 557 S.W.2d 77 (Tex.
1977); Star Furniture Co. v. Pulaski Furniture Co., 297 S.E.2d 854 (W. Va. 1982). But see Mead
Corp. v. Allendale Mut. Ins. Co., 465 F. Supp. 355 (N.D. Ohio 1979) (Ohio law); Cova v.
Harley Davidson Motor Co., 26 Mich. App. 602, 182 N.W.2d 800 (1970); Santor v. A. & M.
Karagheusian, Inc., 44 N.J. 52, 207 A.2d 305 (1965); Iacono v. Anderson Concrete Corp., 42
Ohio St. 2d 88, 326 N.E.2d 267 (1975); Berg v. General Motors Corp., 87 Wash. 2d 584, 555
P.2d 818 (1976); City of La Crosse v. Schubert, Schroeder & Assocs., 72 Wis. 2d 38, 240 N.W.2d
124 (1976).
7. See, e.g., R.W. Murray Co. v. Shatterproof Glass Corp., 697 F.2d 818 (8th Cir. 1983)
(Missouri law); Pennsylvania Glass Sand Corp. v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 652 F.2d 1165 (3d
Cir. 1981) (Pennsylvania law); Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp.,
626 F.2d 280 (3d Cir. 1980) (Illinois law); S.M. Wilson & Co. v. Smith Int'l Inc., 587 F.2d
1363 (8th Cir. 1978) (California law); Copiers Typewriters Calculators, Inc. v. Toshiba Corp.,
576 F. Supp. 312 (D. Md. 1983) (Maryland law); Consolidated Edison Co. v. Westinghouse
Elec. Corp., 567 F. Supp. 358 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); County of Westchester v. General Motors
Corp., 555 F. Supp. 290 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); Kaiser Alum. & Chem. Corp. v. Ingersoll-Rand
Co., 519 F. Supp. 60 (S.D. Ga. 1981); Tribble Trucking Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 144
U.C.C. REP. SERV. (CALLAGHAN) 63 (N.D. Ga. 1973); Karl's Shoe Stores, Ltd. v. United Shoe
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who has suffered economic injury but no personal injury or property damage8
may recover only if he can establish fraud, misrepresentation, 9 or a breach

Mach. Corp., 145 F. Supp. 376 (D. Mass. 1956); Donovan Constr. Co. v. General Elec. Co.,
133 F. Supp. 870 (D. Minn. 1955); Arrow Leasing Corp. v. Cummins Ariz. Diesel, Inc., 666
P.2d 544 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1983); Anthony v. Kelsey-Hayes Co., 25 Cal. App. 3d 442, 102 Cal.
Rptr. 113 (1972); Wyatt v. Cadillac Motor Car Div., 145 Cal. App. 2d 423, 302 P.2d 665
(1956); Crowell Corp. v. Topkis Constr. Co., 280 A.2d 730 (Del. Super. Ct. 1971); GAF Corp.
v. Zack Co., 445 So. 2d 350 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984); Chrysler Corp. v. Taylor, 141 Ga.
App. 671, 234 S.E.2d 123 (1977); Long v. Jim Letts Oldsmobile, Inc., 135 Ga. App. 293, 217
S.E.2d 602 (1975); Clark v. International Harvester Co., 99 Idaho 326, 581 P.2d 784 (1978);
Moorman Mfg. Co. v. National Tank Co., 91 111. 2d 69, 435 N.E.2d 443 (1982); Marcil v.
John Deere Indus. Equip Co., 9 Mass. App. 625, 403 N.E.2d 430 (1980); A.C. Hoyle Co. v.
Sperry Rand Corp., 128 Mich. App. 557, 340 N.W.2d 326 (1983); Superwood Corp. v. Siempelkamp Corp., 311 N.W.2d 159 (Minn. 1981); National Crane Corp. v. Ohio Steel Tube Co.,
213 Neb. 782, 322 N.W.2d 39 (1983); Mid-Hudson Mack, Inc. v. Dutchess Quarry & Supply
Co., 99 A.D.2d 751, 471 N.Y.S.2d 664 (1984); Cayuga Harvester, Inc. v. Allis-Chalmers Corp.,
95 A.D.2d 225, 465 N.Y.S.2d 606 (1983); Amodeo v. Autocraft Hudson, Inc., 195 N.Y.S.2d 711
(Sup. Ct. 1959), aff'd, 12 A.D. 2d 499, 207 N.Y.S.2d 101 (1960); Trans World Airlines, Inc.
v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 1 Misc. 2d 477, 148 N.Y.S.2d 284 (1955); Inglis v. American Motors
Corp., 3 Ohio St. 2d 132, 209 N.E.2d 583 (1965). But see Moorman Mfg. Co. v. National
Tank Co., 92 Il.App. 3d 136, 414 N.E.2d 1302 (1980), rev'd on this point, 91 111. 2d 69, 435
N.E.2d 443 (1982); Omni Flying Club, Inc. v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 366 Mass. 154, 315 N.E.2d
885 (1974); Groppel Co. v. United States Gypsum Co., 616 S.W.2d 49 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981);
State ex rel. Western Seed Prod. Corp. v. Campbell, 250 Or. 262, 442 P.2d 215 (1968), cert.
denied, 393 U.S. 1093 (1969); Nobility Homes Inc. v. Shivers, 557 S.W.2d 77 (Tex. 1977); Berg
v. General Motors Corp., 87 Wash. 2d 584, 555 P.2d 818 (1976).
8. The distinction between "property damage" and "economic loss" is not always a clear
one. Although there is little difficulty when a product causes physical damage to other property
(property damage) or when the only damage is loss of use of the product itself or other
consequential economic losses (economic loss), substantial difficulties arise when there is "damage" to the product itself. The most common approach is to treat damage to the product itself
as "property damage" when it results from a sudden calamitous occurrence or accident which
could endanger people or other property, but to treat such damage as "economic loss" when
it does not result from such an accident. See, e.g., Flintkote Co. v. Dravo Corp., 678 F.2d
942 (11th Cir. 1982) (applying Georgia law); Northern Power & Eng'g Corp. v. Caterpillar
Tractor Co., 623 P.2d 324 (Alaska 1981); National Crane Corp. v. Ohio Steel Tube Co., 213
Neb. 782, 332 N.W.2d 39 (1983); Russell v. Ford Motor Co., 281 Or. 587, 575 P.2d 1383
(1978); Industrial Uniform Rental Co. v. International Harvester Co., 317 Pa. Super. 65, 463
A.2d 1085 (1983); Star Furniture Co. v. Pulaski Furniture Co., 297 S.E.2d 854 (W. Va. 1982).
For a discussion of the distinction between "property damage" and "economic loss," see
PROSSER, supra note 1, at 707-09; Franklin, supra note 3, at 979-90; Ribstein, Guidelinesfor
Deciding ProductEconomicLoss Cases,29 MERCER L. RaY. 493, 496-501 (1978); Note, Products
Liability: Expanding the Property Damage Exception in Pure Economic Loss Cases, 54 Cm.KEr L. Rv.963, 968-72 (1978).
The problem of distinguishing economic loss from property damage is beyond the scope
of this article. Rather than focusing on the difficulties involved in that distinction, this article
deals with the question of under what circumstances, if any, economic losses should be recoverable under a negligence theory in products cases.
9. Purely economic losses may be recovered in actions for fraud or intentional misrepresentation in products cases. See, e.g., Glovatorium, Inc. v. NCR Corp., 684 F.2d 658 (9th Cir.
1982) (purchaser of defective computer system awarded over $250,000 in consequential damages
and over $2,000,000 in punitive damages for intentional misrepresentation); Triangle Underwriters, Inc. v. Honeywell, Inc., 604 F.2d 737 (2d Cir. 1979), after remand and second appeal,
651 F.2d 132 (2d Cir. 1981) (buyer of computer system recovered $35,000 in damages for fraud
in the inducement of the contract). See generally PROSSER, supra note 1, at 725-70.

INDIANA LA W JOURNAL

[Vol. 61:593

of warranty. If the contract of sale sufficiently limits express warranties'0
and disclaims implied warranties" the damaged purchaser may have no
remedy at all even if his damage is demonstrably a result of the defendant's

carelessness. In cases where the plaintiff did not purchase the defective
product directly from the defendant the obstacles to recovery are even
greater.' 2 Although a large majority of courts clearly subscribe to this approach, there continue to be occasional courts, 3 and dissenting judges,' 4

who would permit recovery in tort. It may be that these courts and judges
never sufficiently learned the old maxim that "hard cases make bad law,"
but often an accumulation of "hard cases" is symptomatic of a doctrinal
deficiency.

There has been much discussion concerning the applicability or non-applicability of strict tort liability to economic loss resulting from defective

products. 5 There has been much less discussion, however, concerning re-

10. See generally U.C.C. §§ 2-313, 2-316 (1978).
I1. See generally id. §§ 2-314 to 2-316.
12. Many courts still require privity of contract in actions seeking to recover purely economic
loss on the basis of breach of implied warranties. See, e.g., Curtis v. Murphy Elevator Co.,
407 F. Supp. 940 (E.D. Tenn. 1976); Flory v. Silvercrest Indus., 129 Ariz. 514, 633 P.2d 383
(1981); Hole v. General Motors Corp., 83 A.D.2d 715, 442 N.Y.S.2d 638 (1981); City of La
Crosse v. Schubert, Schroeder & Assocs., 72 Wis. 2d 38, 240 N.W.2d 124 (1976). But see,
e.g., Morrow v. New Moon Homes, Inc., 548 P.2d 279 (Alaska 1976); Hiles Co. v. Johnston
Pump Co., 93 Nev. 73, 560 P.2d 154 (1977); Old Albany Estates, Ltd. v. Highland Carpet
Mills, Inc., 604 P.2d 849 (Okla. 1979); Western Equip. Co. v. Sheridan Iron Works, Inc., 605
P.2d 806 (Wyo. 1980). See generally J. WmTE & R. Summdas, UNwORm COMMERCIAL CODE
399-411 (2d ed. 1979).
13. See, e.g., Mead Corp. v. Allendale Mut. Ins. Co., 465 F. Supp. 355 (N.D. Ohio 1979)
(recovery allowed under strict liability); Omni Eying Club, Inc. v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 366
Mass. 154, 315 N.E.2d 885 (1974) (recovery allowed under negligence); Cova v. Harley Davidson
Motor Co., 26 Mich. App. 602, 182 N.W.2d 800 (1970) (recovery allowed under tort theory
without proving negligence); Groppel Co. v. United States Gypsum Co., 616 S.W.2d 49 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1981) (recovery allowed under negligence); Santor v. A. & M. Karagheusian, Inc.,

44 N.J. 52, 207 A.2d.305 (1965) (recovery allowed under strict liability); Iacono v. Anderson
Concrete Corp., 42 Ohio St. 2d 88, 326 N.E.2d 267 (1975) (recovery allowed under strict
liability); State ex rel. Western Seed Prod. Corp. v. Campbell, 250 Or. 262, 442 P.2d 215
(1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1093 (1969) (recovery allowed under negligence); Nobility Homes,

Inc. v. Shivers, 557 S.W.2d 77 (Tex. 1977) (recovery allowed under negligence); Berg v. General
Motors Corp., 87 Wash. 2d 584, 555 P.2d 818 (1976) (recovery allowed under negligence); City
of La Crosse v. Schubert, Schroeder & Assocs., 72 Wis. 2d 38, 240 N.W.2d 124 (1976) (recovery
allowed under strict liability). But see Moorman Mfg. Co. v. National Tank Co., 92 11. App.
3d 136, 414 N.E.2d 1302 (1980), rev'd on this point, 91 111. 2d 69, 435 N.E.2d 443 (1982) (no
recovery for economic loss under either negligence or strict tort liability).
14. See, e.g., Seely v. White Motor Co., 63 Cal. 2d 9, 403 P.2d 145, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17
(1965) (Peters, J., concurring and dissenting); Superwood Corp. v. Siempelkamp Corp., 311
N.W.2d 159 (Minn. 1981) (Yetka, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Price v. Gatlin,
241 Or. 315, 405 P.2d 502 (1965) (O'Connell, J., dissenting, joined by Sloan & Denecke, JJ.);
see also Morrow v. New Moon Homes, Inc., 548 P.2d 279 (Alaska 1976) (Erwin, J., concurring).
15. See, e.g., Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 626 F.2d 280
(3d Cir. 1980); Seely v. White Motor Co., 63 Cal. 2d 9, 403 P.2d 145, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17 (1965);
Moorman Mfg. Co. v. National Tank Co., 91 111. 2d 69, 435 N.E.2d 443 (1982); Santor v. A.
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covery of such losses in negligence. 6 In part this may be due to the existence
of a broader notion that, as a general matter, negligent injury to purely
economic interests of any sort is simply not actionable. 7 Often courts simply
allude to this general notion as the basis for denying the cause of action in
products liability cases.' 8 Frequently, too, courts discuss the arguments against

& M. Karagheusian, Inc., 44 N.J. 52, 206 A.2d 305 (1965); see also cited supra note 6.
The commentary has been extensive on the matter of strict products liability and economic
loss. See Franklin, supra note 3; Golker & Yesavich, Recovery of Economic Loss Based Upon
Strict Products Liability, 54 N.Y. ST. B.J. 519 (1982); Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel (Strict
Liability to the Consumer), 50 MIN. L. REv. 791 (1966); Ribstein, supra note 8; Sales &
Perdue, Strict Liability in Texas, 14 Hous. L. Ra,. 1 (1977); Speidel, Products Liability,
Economic Loss and the UCC, 40 TENN. L. Ray. 309 (1973); Note, Products LiabilityManufacturerNot Liablefor Economic Losses of Consumer Under Theory of Strict Liability,
15 BnriAxo L. REV. 758 (1966); Note, Economic Loss in Products Liability Jurisprudence, 66
CoLum. L. Rav. 917 (1966); Comment, Strict Liability: Recovery of "Economic" Loss, 13
IDAHO L. Ray. 29 (1976); Note, Economic Losses and Strict Products Liability: A Record of
Judicial Confusion Between Contract and Tort, 54 NoTRE DAME LAW. 118 (1978); Note,
Manufacturer'sStrict Tort Liability to Consumers for Economic Loss, 41 ST. JoiN's L. Ra,.
401 (1967); Comment, The Vexing Problem of the Purely Economic Loss in ProductsLiability:
An Injury in Search of a Remedy, 4 SETON HAu 145 (1972); Comment, Strict Liability-Will
It be Expanded to Allow Recovery for Commercial Loss?, 16 S.TEx. L.J. 341 (1975).
16. There has, however, been some discussion of the issue. See, e.g., Clark v. International
Harvester Co., 99 Idaho 326, 335-36, 581 P.2d 784, 793-94 (1978) (court discussed but rejected
negligence recovery for economic loss); Moorman Mfg. Co. v. National Tank Co., 92 Ill. App.
3d 136, 414 N.E.2d 1302 (1980) (recovery for economic loss allowed under negligence and strict
tort liability theories), rev'd on this point, 91 Ill.
2d 69, 435 N.E.2d 443 (1982) (plaintiffs
cannot recover for pure economic loss under tort theories of strict tort liability, negligence and
innocent misrepresentation); Superwood Corp. v. Siempelkamp Corp., 311 N.W.2d 159, 16263 (Minn. 1981) (Yetka, J., concurring in majority's conclusion that strict tort liability cannot
be used by a commercial plaintiff to recover pure economic loss, but dissenting on the grounds
that commercial plaintiffs should be able to assert negligence theories against a manufacturer
to recover economic loss); State ex rel. Western Seed Prod. Corp. v. Campbell, 250 Or. 262,
269, 442 P.2d 215, 218 (1968) (to allow strict tort liability would conflict with the U.C.C.
scheme of nonfault recovery under warranty; recovery for negligence, however, since it is fault
based, "falls within the traditional tort rules and presents no serious conflict with the statutory
system of nonfault recovery under the Uniform Commercial Code"); W.R.H., Inc. v. Economy
Builders Supply, 633 P.2d 42 (Utah 1981) (court recognized and discussed the "valid distinctions" between negligence and strict liability, citing Campbell, 250 Or. 262, 442 P.2d 215, with
approval); Tort Theories in Computer Litigation, 38 REc. A.B. CrrY N.Y. 426, 429-31 (1983);
see also cases cited supra note 7 (many of which, however, do not discuss negligence and strict
liability separately).
17. PROSSER, supra note 1, at 657: "Generally speaking, there is no general duty to exercise
reasonable care to avoid intangible economic loss or losses to others that do not arise from
tangible physical harm to persons and tangible things." See also F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE
LAw OF ToRTs § 6.11, at 513 (1956); RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 766(c) (Tent. Draft
No. 23, 1977); Harvey, Economic Losses and Negligence, 50 CAN. B. Rav. 580 (1972); Note,
Negligent Interference with Economic Expectancy: The Case for Recovery, 16 STAN. L. RET.
664 (1964).
18. See, e.g., GAF Corp. v. Zack Co., 445 So. 2d 350 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984);
Vulcan Materials Co. v. Driltech, 251 Ga. 383, 306 S.E.2d 253 (1983); Chrysler Corp. v. Taylor,
141 Ga. App. 671, 234 S.E.2d 123 (1977); Long v. Jim Letts Oldsmobile, Inc., 135 Ga. App.
293, 217 S.E.2d 602 (1975); Alfred N. Koplin & Co. v. Chrysler Corp., 49 Ill. App. 3d 194,
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extending strict liability to economic loss and, without any separate discussion
of negligence, conclude with a broad statement that there is no tort remedy
for purely economic losses in products cases. 9 Indeed, courts occasionally
cite the nonexistence of a cause of action in negligence as a reason for
denying a cause of action in strict liability, noting that it would be anomalous
to impose strict liability where there was no liability even for negligence.20
This article will examine the general rule denying a cause of action in
negligence in products cases where the damages are purely economic. The
article accepts as a premise that this rule, frequently referred to as the
economic loss rule, is consistent with the reasonable expectations of the
parties and, therefore, appropriate in most instances. However, it will argue
that in some circumstances the rule may frustrate rather than implement the
parties' legitimate expectations. Such frustration is most likely to occur in
cases involving custom-manufactured goods which require the seller/manufacturer to render sophisticated design and engineering services as part of
the overall transaction. Courts often treat such transactions as sales rather
than service transactions. As a result, the negligence liability that would
otherwise exist for economic loss resulting from failure to exercise due care
in the performance of such services is eliminated by the economic loss ruleoften to the surprise of the "buyer." Because courts, in justifying the
economic loss rule in products cases, sometimes rely on the general notion
that economic interests are not protected against negligence, this article will
begin with an overview of that broader proposition. This overview will
suggest that the policies underlying that general notion do not provide a
persuasive basis for a blanket rule in products cases. Next the article will
explore the policy justifications for the economic loss rule in the products
cases specifically, and will suggest that the principal justification involves
effectuating the parties' expectations. The article will examine separately the
policy concerns underlying the economic loss rule as they apply to strict
liability and to negligence. It will argue that, while refusal to extend strict
liability to economic loss may be consistent with the parties' expectations,
refusal to recognize a cause of action in negligence may interfere with the
parties' expectations, at least in some cases involving services as well as

364 N.E.2d 100 (1977); National Crane Corp. v. Ohio Steel Tube Co., 213 Neb. 782, 332
N.W.2d 39 (1983); Inglis v. American Motors Corp., 3 Ohio St. 2d 132, 209 N.E.2d 583 (1965);
W.R.H., Inc. v. Economy Builders Supply, 633 P.2d 42 (Utah 1981).
19. See, e.g., Copiers Typewriters Calculators, Inc. v. Toshiba Corp., 576 F. Supp. 312,
324-26 (D. Md. 1983); Alfred N. Koplin & Co. v. Chrysler Corp., 49 I11.App. 3d 194, 364
N.E.2d 100 (1977); Superwood Corp. v. Siempelkamp Corp., 311 N.W.2d 159 (Minn. 1981);
National Crane Corp. v. Ohio Steel Tube Co., 213 Neb. 782, 332 N.W.2d 39 (1983).
20. See, e.g., Fireman's Fund v. Bums Elec. Sec., 93 Ill. App. 3d 298, 417 N.E.2d 131
(1981): "In Illinois, economic losses are not recoverable in tort. [Citations omitted] Although
[previous cases have] proceeded on negligence theories, if economic loss resulting from negligence
is not recoverable in tort, we see no reason for permitting recovery for loss of the same character
in tort without fault."
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goods. The article thus advocates a narrow exception to the economic loss
rule to permit an action for negligent performance of services where sophisticated design or engineering services are rendered as a part of a contract
for custom-designed and manufactured goods. Finally, it should be noted
that the proposed liability for failure to exercise due care in the services
portion of such transactions would not be inconsistent with generally accepted
principles of contract law, but that to the contrary such liability, because it
would be based upon the reasonable expectations of the parties, could be
imposed as a matter of contract law without any reference to tort law
whatsoever.

I.

NEGLIGENCE AND ECONOMIC Loss

Perhaps the most basic principle in the law of negligence is that one is
liable for negligent conduct which causes foreseeable injury to the person
or property of another. 2' It is perhaps surprising, therefore, that courts have
shown great reluctance to impose similar liability for negligent conduct which
causes foreseeable injury to the economic interests of another,2 at least in
cases in which the injury is limited to economic interests.2
Courts have applied general rules denying recovery for negligent infringement of contract and other economic interests in a wide variety of factual
circumstances. A common scenario involves a negligent injury to the person
or property of one party which in turn causes economic loss to a third party.
Courts have denied recovery where a personal injury to an initial victim
results in economic loss to the victim's employer through loss of the victim's
services,24 or to one who had a contractual obligation to provide medical

21. See PROSSER, supra note I, at 359; see also RESTATEMENT (SEcOND)

OF

TORTS § 328A(d)

(1979).
22. See PROSSER, supra note 1, at 997-1002 and 1008-09. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 766C (1979), entitled Negligent Interference with Contractor ProspectiveContractualRelation,
provides:
One is not liable to another for pecuniary harm not deriving from physical harm
to the other, if that harm results from the actor's negligently
(a) causing a third person not to perform a contract with the other,
(b) interfering with the other's performance of his contract or making the
performance more expensive or burdensome, or
(c) interfering with the other's acquiring a contractual relation witli a third
person.
See also F. HARPER & F. JAmS, supra note 17, at 501-13 (1956); Harvey, supra note 17;
James, Limitations on Liability for Economic Loss Caused by Negligence: A PragmaticAppraisal, 25 VAN. L. REv. 43, 44 (1972); Comment, Negligent Interference with Economic
Expectancy: The Case for Recovery, 16 STAN. L. REv. 664 (1964).
23. See PROSSER, supra note 1, at 997; see also infra notes 35, 36.
24. See, e.g., Baughman Surgical Assocs. v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 302 So. 2d 316
(La. Ct. App. 1974) (defendant insurer held not liable to plaintiff professional medical corporation for loss of working time when one of its employees was injured as a result of accident
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care to the victim, 2 or to an insurance company that insured the victim's
life or health. 26 In other cases courts have denied recovery where the destruction of property belonging to a third party resulted in some economic
injury to the plaintiff. In one case the court denied recovery for losses
sustained by the plaintiff as a result of the defendant's negligent destruction
of the only bridge to the island where the plaintiff's business was located. 27

with the insured); Ferguson v. Green Island Contracting Corp., 36 N.Y.2d 742, 328 N.E.2d
792, 368 N.Y.S.2d 163 (1975) (employer denied recovery of economic loss sustained as a result
of negligent injury to employee responsible for product design and development who was very
difficult to replace); Snow v. West, 250 Or. 114, 440 P.2d 864 (1968) (employer had no cause
of action for lost profits due to loss of employee's services resulting from defendant's alleged
negligence in causing their deaths); Hartridge v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 86 Wis. 2d
1, 271 N.W.2d 598 (1978) (medical clinic had no claim for relief for loss of income due to
injury to employee caused by defendant's negligence); see also United States v. Standard Oil
Co., 332 U.S. 301 (1947) (federal government could not recover for loss of services of a soldier
negligently injured by the defendant).
A traditional common law exception to the rule of non-recovery was recognized in favor
of a master for negligent injury to his servant. At present, however, this exception has little
if any vitality. See PROSSER, supra note 1, at 998; see also infra note 63.
Recovery has also been denied for damages to an employer other than loss of an injured
employee's services per se. For example, where the employer is contractually obligated to
continue paying the injured employee's wages or his medical expenses, or where the employer
has had to pay worker's compensation benefits or has suffered an increase in premiums for
worker's compensation insurance, the employer has not been permitted to recover these payments
from the tortfeasor. See, e.g., Crab Orchard Improvement Co. v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry.,
115 F.2d 277 (4th Cir. 1940), cert. denied, 312 U.S. 702 (1941); The Federal No. 2, 21 F.2d
313 (2d Cir. 1927); Chelsea Moving & Trucking Co. v. Ross Towboat Co., 280 Mass. 282,
182 N.E. 477 (1932); Northern States Contracting Co. v. Oakes, 191 Minn. 88, 253 N.W. 371
(1934); Interstate Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Public Serv. Elec. Co., 86 N.J.L. 26, 90 A. 1062 (1914);
Decker Constr. Co. v. Mathis, 122 N.E.2d 38 (Ohio C.P. 1953); Ore-Ida Foods, Inc. v. Indian
Head Cattle Co., 290 Or. 909, 627 P.2d 469 (1981). But see Jones v. Waterman Steamship
Corp., 155 F.2d 992 (3d Cir. 1936); Midvale Coal Co. v. Cardox Corp., 152 Ohio St. 437, 89
N.E.2d 673 (1949), second appeal, 157 Ohio St. 526, 106 N.E.2d 556 (1952).
25. Fifield Manor v. Finston, 54 Cal. 2d 632, 354 P.2d 1073, 7 Cal. Rptr. 377 (1960)
(denying recovery to a nonprofit organization retirement home which was obligated under a
life-care contract to provide medical care to party negligently injured by defendant).
26. See, e.g., Conn. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. New York & N.H. R.R., 25 Conn. 265 (1856)
(insurance company paid on life insurance policy; held payment from tortfeasor in absence of
subrogation not recoverable); Peoria Marine & Fire Ins. Co. v. Frost, 37 Ill. 333 (1865) (fire
insurance policy); Economy Auto Ins. Co. v. Brown, 334 Ill. App. 579, 79 N.E.2d 854 (1948);
see generally PROSSER, supra note 1, at 999. In certain instances, however, the insurer is allowed
to stand in the shoes of the insured and enforce any claims the insured might have against the
tortfeasor, by way of subrogation. See supra notes 67, 68.
27. Rickards v. Sun Oil Co., 23 N.J. Misc. 89, 41 A.2d 267 (1945). The plaintiffs in
Rickards proceeded on the theory that the negligent conduct of the defendant which resulted
in the destruction of the bridge amounted to a public nuisance, which the plaintiffs were entitled
to enforce because they had suffered "special" damages. Ordinarily, a private individual cannot
complain of a public nuisance either by way of a tort action for damages or by an abatement
action. PROSSER, supra note 1, at 646-52. It is only when the private individual suffers some
particular harm not shared in common by the public that the courts have allowed private
enforcement of a public nuisance. Id. In Rickards, however, the court never reached the issue
of special damages because it held that the defendant's negligent conduct was not the proximate
cause of the plaintiff's economic injury, a threshold requirement in private enforcement of
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In another, plaintiffs who lost their jobs after the defendant negligently
destroyed the factory where they worked could not recover for their loss of
employment. 2 Likewise, courts have denied recovery in numerous cases
where the defendant negligently cut a utility company's power cable or gas
line thereby depriving plaintiff of gas or electricity. 29
Courts have also refused to impose tort liability in cases in which the
defendant negligently failed to perform some obligation (usually contract)
owed to one party and this failure in turn caused economic injury to the
plaintiff. For example, a contractor who negligently fails to complete a
construction project in a timely manner is not normally liable in tort to
third parties economically damaged by the delay. 0 Similarly, an accountant
who negligently prepares an erroneous financial statement, or an attorney
who negligently gives incorrect legal advice, is not liable for losses suffered
by third parties who rely upon that information or advice except in carefully
limited circumstances. 3'

public nuisance cases.
For a good discussion and summary of the cases involving negligent damage or destruction
of public bridges where plaintiffs have been denied recovery for economic loss, see Nebraska
Innkeepers v. Pittsburgh-Des Moines Corp., 345 N.W.2d 124 (Iowa 1984) (plaintiffs could not
maintain action for negligence, breach of warranty and public nuisance to recover economic
loss caused by closure of bridge). See also Leadfree Enters. v. United States Steel Corp., 711
F.2d 805 (7th Cir. 1983); In re Kinsman Transit Co., 388 F.2d 821 (2d Cir. 1968); In re Marine
Navig. Sulphur Carriers, Inc., 507 F. Supp. 205 (E.D. Va. 1980), aff'd, 638 F.2d 700 (4th Cir.
1981); General Foods Corp. v. United States, 448 F. Supp. 111 (D. Md. 1978); Forcum-James
Co. v. Duke Transp. Co., 231 La. 953, 93 So. 2d 228 (1957).
28. Adams v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 50 Cal. App. 3d 37, 123 Cal. Rptr. 216 (1975);
Stevenson v. East Ohio Gas Co., 73 N.E.2d 200 (Ohio Ct. App. 1946). To the extent that
Adams holds that there can be no recovery for negligent interference with prospective economic
advantage, it was later disapproved by the California Supreme Court in J'Aire Corp. v. Gregory,
24 Cal. 3d 799, 807, 598 P.2d 60, 65, 157 Cal. Rptr. 407, 412 (1979).
29. See, e.g., Cargill v. Offshore Logistics, 615 F.2d 212 (5th Cir. 1980); Kaiser Aluminum
v. Marshland, 455 F.2d 957 (5th Cir. 1972); Byrd v. English, 117 Ga. 191, 43 S.E. 419 (1903);
PPG Indus. v. Bean Dredging Co., 447 So. 2d 1058 (La. 1984). But see Dunlop Tire & Rubber
Corp. v. FMC Corp., 53 A.D.2d 150, 385 N.Y.S.2d 971 (1976).
30. Just's, Inc. v. Arrington Constr. Co., 99 Idaho 462, 583 P.2d 997 (1978) (plaintiff
denied recovery in tort, but court allowed recovery in contract under a third party beneficiary
theory); Mandal v. Hoffman Constr. Co., 270 Or. 248, 527 P.2d 387 (1974) (defendant not
liable in tort for negligent performance of contract which resulted in economic loss to plaintff);
see also Alvord & Swift v. S.M. Muller Constr. Co., 46 N.Y.2d 276, 385 N.E.2d 1238, 413
N.Y.S.2d 309 (1978); Keel v. Titan Constr. Corp., 639 P.2d 1228 (Okla. 1981). But see J'Aire
Corp. v. Gregory, 24 Cal. 3d 799, 598 P.2d 60, 157 Cal. Rptr. 407 (1979) (plaintiff lessee
could maintain a negligence action against defendant contractor who allegedly was negligent
in performing his contract with plaintiff's lessor, resulting in economic loss to plaintiff);
Hawthorne v. Kober Constr. Co., 196 Mont. 519, 640 P.2d 467 (1982) (independent workers
in a common project-defendant supplier negligently failed to meet contractual obligations to
general contractor, held liable to subcontractor for economic loss sustained as a result).
31. See, e.g., Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441 (1931) (auditor's
duty is owed only to those with whom he is in privity or to those who are known beneficiaries
at the time of the auditor's undertaking-those for whose "primary benefit" the statements
were intended); RESTATEmENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552 comment a (1979) (liability extends only
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Perhaps the most common situation in which courts deny recovery in tort
for purely economic loss, however, arises in products liability cases. When
a purchaser or user of a defective product suffers economic loss as a result
of the product's failure to function properly the overwhelming majority of
courts refuse to permit recovery from the manufacturer on a negligence
theory.3 2 Frequently the injured party has not acquired the defective product
directly from the defendant and courts often cite lack of privity as a reason
for denying recovery. 33 However, courts have been equally reluctant to permit
34
recovery in cases in which the plaintiff and defendant were in privity.
Despite the broad scope of the general rule restricting liability for the
economic consequences of negligence, there are circumstances in which courts
do impose such liability. The most common circumstance in which courts
35
permit recovery of economic loss is where there is also some physical injury.
Indeed, a common statement of the general rule is that there can be no
36
recovery for economic loss in the absence of some physical injury.

to known and intended class of beneficiaries); PROSSER, supra note 1, at 746-48; see also infra
note 48. But see H. Rosenblum, Inc. v. Adler, 93 N.J. 324, 461 A.2d 138 (1983); Citizens
State Bank v. Timm, Schmidt & Co., 113 Wis. 2d 376, 335 N.W.2d 361 (1983).
32. PROSSER, supra note I, at 708: "Historically . . . the only tort action available to a
disappointed purchaser suffering intangible commercial loss has been the tort action of deceit
for fraud .... [Tihis remains the generally accepted view." See supra note 7 and accompanying
text.
33. E.g., Wyatt v. Cadillac Motor Car Div., 145 Cal. App. 2d 423, 426, 302 P.2d 665,
667 (1956); Crowell Corp. v. Topkis Constr. Co., 280 A.2d 730, 732 (Del. Super. Ct. 1971);
Tolar Constr. Co. v. GAF Corp., 154 Ga. App. 127, 127, 267 S.E.2d 635, 638 (1980); Local
Joint Exec. Bd. v. Stern, 98 Nev. 409, 410, 651 P.2d 637, 638 (1982); Trans World Airlines
v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 1 Misc. 2d 477, 479, 148 N.Y.S.2d 284, 290 (1955); Inglis v. American
Motors Corp., 3 Ohio St. 2d 132, 132, 209 N.E.2d 583, 583 (1965).
34.
We believe that the issue of privity merely diverts attention from the fundamental
issue presented: whether a negligence action can be maintained by any plaintiff
who claims only damages such as those alleged in this case [pure economic loss].
In reaching our decision, we do not rely on the presence or absence of privity
between the plaintiff and the defendants.
Marcil v. John Deere Indus. Equip. Co., 403 N.E.2d 430, 434 n.5 (Mass. App. Ct. 1980); see
also Consolidated Edison Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 567 F. Supp. 358 (S.D.N.Y. 1983);
County of Westchester v. General Motors Corp., 555 F. Supp. 290 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); Moorman
Mfg. Co. v. National Tank Co., 91 111. 2d 69, 435 N.E.2d 443 (1982); A.C. Hoyle Co. v.
Sperry Rand Corp., 128 Mich. App. 557, 340 N.W.2d 326 (1983); McGhee v. General Motors
Corp., 98 Mich. App. 495, 296 N.W.2d 286 (1980); National Crane Corp. v. Ohio Steel Tube
Co., 213 Neb. 782, 332 N.W.2d 39 (1983).
35. See, e.g., LeSueur Creamery, Inc. v. Haskon, Inc., 660 F.2d 342 (8th Cir. 1981), cert.
denied, 455 U.S. 1019 (1982); Newlin v. New England Tel. & Tel. Co., 316 Mass. 234, 54
N.E.2d 929 (1944); Duchene v. Wolstan, 258 N.W.2d 601 (Minn. 1977); Dunlop Tire & Rubber
Corp. v. FMC Corp., 53 A.D.2d 150, 385 N.Y.S.2d 971 (1976); Turner v. Reynolds, 271 A.D.
413, 66 N.Y.S.2d 339 (1946).
36. See, e.g., State of La. ex rel. Guste v. M/V Testbank, 752 F.2d 1019, 1021 (5th Cir.
1985); Just's, Inc. v. Arrington Constr. Co., 99 Idaho 462, 468 & n.1, 583 P.2d 997, 1003 &
n.1 (1978); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 766C comment b (1979).
The difference in treatment between pure economic loss on the one hand and economic loss

1986]

NEGLIGENCE AND THE U.C.C

Even where the plaintiff suffers exclusively economic loss, courts permit
recovery in negligence where there is some special relationship between the

accompanied by some physical injury on the other has been criticized as being arbitrary and
as leading to anomalous results. For example, in Moorman Mfg. Co. v. National Tank Co.,
92 111.App. 3d 136, 414 N.E.2d 1302 (1980), rev'd, 91 Ill. 2d 69, 435 N.E.2d 443 (1982), the
court stated:
In products liability actions in which the plaintiff has suffered either personal
injury or property damage, courts have generally also allowed recovery for economic losses ....
To deny recovery for economic loss under strict liability in tort
when there is no accompanying personal injury or property damage is an arbitrary
distinction leading to opposite results in cases that are virtually indistinguishable.
In the instant case, had the plaintiff alleged that a mere bushel of corn had been
destroyed by rain water leaking into the tank through the crack, then it would
have suffered property damage sufficient to allow recovery of economic loss.
Likewise, if an individual had cut his finger while inspecting the crack in the
tank, he would have suffered a personal injury allowing recovery for all types of
harm.
Id. at 141, 414 N.E.2d at 1307. Similarly, Justice Peters' concurring and dissenting opinion in
Seely v. White Motor Co., 63 Cal. 2d 9, 25, 403 P.2d 145, 155-56, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17, 27-28
(1965) (emphasis in original), stated:
Suppose, for example, defective house paint is sold to two home owners. One
suffers temporary illness from noxious fumes, while the other's house is destroyed
by rot because the paint proved ineffective (a loss generally uninsured). Although
the latter buyer may clearly suffer the greater misfortune, the majority would not
let him recover under a strict liability doctrine because his loss is solely "economic," while letting the first buyer recover the minimal costs and lost earnings
caused by his illness.
The majority opinion in Seely was written by Chief Justice Traynor:
The distinction . . . between tort recovery for physical injuries and warranty
recovery for economic loss is not arbitrary and does not rest on the "luck" of
one plaintiff in having an accident causing physical injury. The distinction rests,
rather, on an understanding of the nature of the responsibility a manufacturer
must undertake in distributing his products. A manufacturer can appropriately
be held liable for physical injuries caused by defects by requiring his goods to
match a standard of safety defined in terms of conditions that create unreasonable
risks of harm. He cannot be held for the level of performance of his products
in the consumer's business unless he agrees that the product was designed to meet
the consumer's demands.
Id. at 18, 403 P.2d at 151, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 23.
In some instances, courts appear to have stretched the property damage concept to its limits
to find the accompanying physical injury necessary to permit recovery of economic loss. In
LeSueur Creamery, Inc. v. Haskon, Inc., 660 F.2d 342 (8th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S.
1019 (1982), for example, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held that a cheesemaker
could recover in negligence for lost profits resulting from a loss of cheese yield caused by
excessive heat from a pasteurizer installed by the defendant, on the basis that there had been
property damage in addition to the economic loss. In describing the property damage the court
stated: "The excessive heat denatured the whey proteins in the milk and reduced the solubility
of the ionic calcium in the milk and this damage decreased LeSueur's yield." 660 F.2d at 349.
In another case, one court held that damage to a piece of paper (a football pool coupon) was
sufficient to allow recovery for the lost prize of $20,000. Bart v. British West Indian Airways,
[1967] 1 Lloyd's List L.R. 239, 267 (Guyana Ct. App.). See also Note, Products Liability:
Expanding the Property Damage Exception in Pure Economic Loss Cases, 54 Cm.-KENT L.
REv. 963 (1978).
For an explanation of the difference in treatment between pure economic loss and economic
loss accompanied by some physical injury, see supra notes 92, 93.
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parties.17 A sufficient relationship is found most easily where the defendant
stands in a fiduciary or professional relationship to the plaintiff.3" Thus a
trustee may be liable if in fulfilling his trust he negligently injures the
4
4
39
economic interests of a beneficiary. Similarly an accountant, 0 attorney, '
42
43
architect, engineer or other professional" may be liable to his client for
malpractice even though the damages are purely economic.4 1 Moreover,

37. "There are, however, a few situations in which recovery [in a negligence action] has
been permitted, all of them apparently to be justified upon the basis of some special relation
between the parties." PROSSER, supra note 1, at 1008.
38. See infra notes 39-44.
39. See RESTATEmENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS §§ 174, 201 (1979); see also id. § 205 illustrations
1-7.
40. See, e.g., Dantzler Lumber & Export Co. v. Columbia Casualty Co., 115 Fla. 541, 156
So. 116 (1934); National Surety Corp. v. Lybrand, 256 A.D. 226, 9 N.Y.S.2d 554 (1939)
(accountant held liable for failure to discover embezzlements by employee of accountant's client,
resulting in economic loss to client); Smith v. London Assur. Corp., 109 A.D. 882, 96 N.Y.S.
820 (1905).
41. See, e.g., Smiley v. Manchester Ins. & Indem. Co., 71 Ill. 2d 306, 375 N.E.2d 118
(1978) (defendant attorney held liable in negligence for failing to settle a case, resulting in
economic loss to plaintiff); Practical Offset, Inc. v. Davis, 83 Ill. App. 3d 566, 404 N.E.2d
516 (1980) (attorney held liable for failing to file a financing statement to perfect a security
interest of plaintiff, resulting in economic loss); House v. Maddox, 46 I1. App. 3d 68, 360
N.E.2d 580 (1977) (attorney held liable in negligence for allowing a statute of limitations to
run without instituting suit in his client's behalf, thus depriving his client of any compensation).
42. See, e.g., Bayshore Dev. Co. v. Bonfoey, 75 Fla. 455, 78 So. 507 (1918); Housing
Authority v. Ayers, 211 Ga. 728, 88 S.E.2d 368 (1955) (additional expenses to correct building
defects held recoverable on a negligence theory against architect for failing to provide sufficient
footing for foundations in his drawings and specifications); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Enco
Assocs., Inc., 43 N.Y.2d 389, 372 N.E.2d 555, 401 N.Y.S.2d 767 (1977); Paver & Wildfoerster
v. Catholic High School Ass'n, 38 N.Y.2d 669, 345 N.E.2d 565, 382 N.Y.S.2d 22 (1976);
Hubert v. Aitken, 2 N.Y.S. 711, 25 N.E. 954 (C.P. 1888), reargued, 5 N.Y.S. 839 (1889)
(plaintiff can recover cost to repair defect in house from architect under a negligence theory);
Surf Realty Corp. v. Standing, 195 Va. 431, 78 S.E.2d 901 (1953) (plaintiffs allowed to maintain
a negligence action against architect for failure to discover defect and negligent supervision of
roof construction which resulted in loss of plaintiff's contractual expectation and in the junking
and salvaging of the roof structure).
43. See, e.g., Mauldin v. Sheffer, 113 Ga. App. 874, 150 S.E.2d 150 (1966) (plaintiff
architect's complaint against mechanical engineer seeking to recover economic losses allegedly
resulting from defendant engineer's negligence in drawing up faulty designs, plans and specifications for the plaintiff held to have stated a cause of action ex delicto); Audlane Lumber
& Builders Supply, Inc. v. D.E. Britt Assocs., 168 So. 2d 333 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1964), cert.
denied, 173 So. 2d 146 (Fla. 1965).
44. See, e.g., Ajax Hardware Mfg. Corp. v. Industrial Plants Corp., 569 F.2d 181, 185
(2d Cir. 1977) (machinery appraisers); Remeikis v. Boss & Phelps, Inc., 419 A.2d 986, 991
(D.C. 1980) (real estate agent); McAlvain v. General Ins. Co., 97 Idaho 777, 554 P.2d 955
(1976) (insurance agent); Essex v. Ryan, 446 N.E.2d 368 (Ind. Ct. App. 1983) (surveyor);
Commissioner of Highways v. Beebe, 55 Mich. 137, 20 N.W. 826 (1884) (surveyor); Morin v.
Divide County Abstract Co., 183 N.W. 1006 (N.D. 1921) (abstractor).
45. RESTATEMENT (SEcoN-D) OF TORTS § 552(1) (1979), entitled Information Negligently
Supplied for the Guidance of Others, provides:
One who, in the course of his business, profession or employment, or in any
other transaction in which he has a pecuniary interest, supplies false information
for the guidance of others in their business transactions, is subject to liability for
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liability for economic loss caused by negligent performance of services is not
limited to professional malpractice actions but rather may extend to other
service transactions as well. 46
Occasionally courts have imposed liability for purely economic loss even
in the absence of any contractual relationship between the parties. Although
the traditional rule was to the contrary, 47 a number of courts have now

held that an accountant who negligently prepares an erroneous financial
statement for a client may be liable not only for losses suffered by the client,
but also for economic loss suffered by a third party who relies upon the
erroneous statement. 4 Some courts have imposed similar liability upon

pecuniary loss caused to them by their justifiable reliance upon the information,
if he fails to exercise reasonable care or competence in obtaining or communicating
the information.
While § 552 speaks in terms of negligent communication of information, the principle of liability
it embodies seems to be broader than that, for courts have imposed liability for economic loss
in numerous instances which cannot comfortably be described in terms of negligent misrepresentation. See, e.g., Smiley v. Manchester Ins. & Indem. Co., 71 I. 2d 306, 375 N.E.2d 118
(1978) (attorney liable in negligence for failing to settle a claim); Practical Offset, Inc. v. Davis,
83 Il1. App. 3d 566, 404 N.E.2d 516 (1980) (failure to file a financing statement in order to
perfect a security interest); House v. Maddox, 46 Ill. App. 3d 68, 360 N.E.2d 580 (1977) (failure
to file suit before the statute of limitations ran out).
46. See infra note 203. For example, courts have imposed liabilty in negligence for economic
loss upon a test hole driller, Gagne v. Bertran, 34 Cal. 2d 481, 275 P.2d 15 (1954), a telephone
company, Bunch v. South Central Bell Tel. Co., 356 So. 2d 104 (La. Ct. App. 1978), and a
burglar alarm company, DCR Inc. v. Peak Alarm Co., 663 P.2d 433 (Utah 1983).
47. Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441 (1931), holding that a public
accountant who negligently made an audit report could not be liable in negligence to third
parties who justifiably relied on it, represented the position of most American courts until
recently, and it is still followed in several jurisdictions. See Investors Tax Sheltered Real Estate
Ltd. v. Laventhold, Krekstein, Horwath & Horwath, 370 So. 2d 815 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979);
MacNerland v. Barnes, 129 Ga. App. 367, 199 S.E.2d 564 (1973); Dworman v. Lee, 83 A.D.2d
507, 441 N.Y.S.2d 90 (1981) (mem.), aff'd without opinion, 56 N.Y.2d 816, 438 N.E.2d 103,
452 N.Y.S.2d 570 (1982).
48. E.g., Rhode Island Hosp. Trust Nat'l Bank v. Swartz, Bresenoff, Yavner & Jacobs,
455 F.2d 847 (4th Cir. 1972) (accountants liable to third parties who are actually foreseen and
who belong to a limited class of persons) (applying Rhode Island law); Briggs v. Sterner, 529
F. Supp. 1155 (S.D. Iowa 1981) (accountant liable in negligence to third parties for whose
benefit and guidance the accountant knows the information is intended); Rusch Factors, Inc.
v. Levin, 284 F. Supp. 85 (D.R.I. 1968) (accountant who knew that the statements were to be
used by his client for the purpose of obtaining credit from a third party, but who did not
know of the specific relying third party, held liable in negligence to that third party); Brumley
v. Touche, Ross & Co., 123 Ill. App. 3d 636, 463 N.E.2d 195 (1984) (where accountant acts
at the direction of or on behalf of his client to benefit or influence a third party, he may be
held liable in negligence to that third party); H. Rosenblum, Inc. v. Adler, 93 N.J. 324, 461
A.2d 138 (1983) (accountants owe duty in negligence to third parties who are reasonably
foreseeable recipients of the statements, who receive the statements for proper business purposes
and who justifiably rely on them); Haddon View Inv. Co. v. Coopers & Lybrand, 70 Ohio St.
2d 154, 436 N.E.2d 212 (1982) (accountant may be held liable to third party for negligence
when that third party is a member of a limited class whose reliance is specifically foreseen);
Shatterproof Glass Corp. v. James, 466 S.W.2d 873 (Tex. Civ. App. 1971) (accountant liable
for negligence in certification of audit reports to corporations knowing that these reports would
be used by creditors in making loans to corporations); Citizens State Bank v. Timm, Schmidt
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attorneys, 49 surveyors, 0 abstractors, 51 and others52 who provide information

for the guidance of others. In most of these cases, however, the defendants
furnished the information for the specific purpose of inducing reliance by
the plaintiffs, or at least with the knowledge that the information would be
used for that purpose. 3
As with liability to one's own client, 54 liability to third parties is not limited
to cases of negligent misrepresentation, but may extend to negligent per-

formance of other services so long as there is a sufficient relationship between

& Co., 113 Wis. 2d 376, 386, 335 N.W.2d 361, 366 (1983) ("[Iliability will be imposed
on ... accountants for the foreseeable injuries resulting from their negligent acts unless, as a
matter of policy to be decided by the Court, recovery is denied on grounds of public policy");
see also PROSSER, supra note I, at 746-48; Keeton, Professional Malpractice, 17 WAsHBURN
L.J. 445 (1978); Prosser, Misrepresentationand Third Persons, 19 VArD. L. REv. 231 (1966);
Comment, Adjusting Accountants' Liabilityfor Negligence, 13 BALTIMOR L. Rav. 301 (1984);
Note, TORT LAw-The Enlarging Scope of Auditor's Liability to Relying Third Parties, 59
NoTRE DAME LAW. 281 (1983); Note, Accountant's Liability to Third Parties, 52 NOTaR DAME
LAW. 281 (1977); Annot., 46 A.L.R.3d 979 (1972).
49. See, e.g., Heyer v. Flaig, 70 Cal.2d 223, 449 P.2d 161, 74 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1969); Lucas
v. Hanem, 56 Cal. 2d 583, 364 P.2d 685, 15 Cal. Rptr. 821 (1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 987
(1962); Roberts v. Ball, Hunt, Hart, Brown & Baerwitz, 57 Cal. App. 3d 104, 128 Cal. Rptr.
901 (1976); Licata v. Spector, 26 Conn. Super. Ct. 378, 225 A.2d 28 (1966); United Leasing
Corp. v. Miller, 45 N.C. App. 400, 263 S.E.2d 313 (1980); Guy v. Liederbach, 279 P. Super.
543, 421 A.2d 333 (1980); Auric v. Continental Gas. Co., 111 Wis. 2d 507, 331 N.W.2d 325
(1983).
50. See, e.g., Rozny v. Marzul, 83 I11.2d 110, 250 N.E.2d 656 (1969) (surveyor liable in
negligence to plaintiffs for his preparation of an inaccurate survey which he had done several
years before for a different party, and which plaintiffs subsequently obtained and relied on,
causing them economic loss); Tarter v. Palumbo, 224 Tenn. 262, 453 S.W.2d 780 (1970)
(allegations that defendant surveyor negligently prepared a survey and plot for buyer of property,
and that plaintiff sellers of the property sustained damage when required to move the house
because of inaccurate survey and plot, held to state a cause of action for negligent misrepresentation despite absence of privity between plaintiff and defendant).
51. William v. Polger, 391 Mich. 6, 215 N.W.2d 149 (1974) (abstractor's liability for
negligent misrepresentation arising out of his contractual duties extends to those an abstractor
could reasonably foresee as relying on the accuracy of the abstract that is put into circulation);
Kovaleski v. Tallahassee Title Co., 363 So. 2d 1156 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978) (abstractor's
liability for economic loss proximately caused by negligent performance of his contractual duty
extends to any reasonably foreseeable plaintiff even if not in privity with the abstractor).
52. Glanzer v. Shepard, 233 N.Y. 236, 135 N.E. 275 (1922) (public weigher who certified
an incorrect weight of beans held liable under a negligent misrepresentation theory to a purchaser
of a quantity of the beans); United States v. Rogers & Rogers, 161 F. Supp. 132 (S.D. Cal.
1958) (applying California law) (architect); Hardy v. Carmichael, 207 Cal. App. 2d 218, 24
Cal. Rptr. 475 (1962) (termite inspector); see also REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552 (1979)
(discussed supra note 45).
53. See cases cited supra note 48. With respect to these cases Prosser notes that
[t]he obligation arising out of the implied promise to render the service with
reasonable care extends to the promisee and third party beneficiaries, and it is
extremely doubtful if courts have carried liability any further than could have
been carried through the reasonable application of third party beneficiary ideas.
The main point to be made is that liability that has been imposed could have
been imposed on a contractual basis.
PROSSER, supra note 1, at 746.
54. See supra note 44.
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the parties. 5 Indeed it has been suggested that misperformance of a contract
by anyone in a public calling may be actionable by a party on whose behalf
the contract was made.5 6 In addition, some courts have held subcontractors
or suppliers who negligently delay a construction project liable to other
subcontractors who suffer economic loss due to the delay. 57 And, in one
case a bank which provided construction financing for a housing development
was held liable to the purchasers of defective homes for its negligent failure
58
to insist on adequate inspections during construction.
Courts have also imposed liability for negligent injury to economic interests
in cases in which there is a special relationship (usually a family relationship),
not between the plaintiff and the defendant, but rather between the plaintiff
and the initial victim of the defendant's negligence. 9 Thus, a spouse can

55. See Biakanja v. Irving, 49 Cal. 2d 647, 320 P.2d 16 (1958) (notary public; will not
properly attested). In Biakanja the court stated:
The determination of whether, in a specific case, the defendant will be held liable
to a third person not in privity is a matter of policy and involves the balancing
of various factors, among which are the extent to which the transaction was
intended to affect the plaintiff, the foreseeability of harm to him, the degree of
certainty that the plaintiff suffered injury, the closeness of the connection between
the defendant's conduct and the injury suffered, the moral blame attached to the
defendant's conduct, and the policy of preventing future harm.
Id. at 650, 320 P.2d at 19; see also Connor v. Great Western Savings & Loan Ass'n, 69 Cal.
2d 850, 447 P.2d 609, 73 Cal. Rptr. 369 (1968); Lucas v. Hamm, 56 Cal. 2d 583, 364 P.2d
685, 15 Cal. Rptr. 821 (1961) (attorney's negligent drafting of will), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 987
(1962); Ross v. Caunters, [1979] 3 All E.R. 580. Accord McAbee v. Edwards, 340 So. 2d 1167
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976) (failure to advise change in will necessary upon remarriage); Ward
v. Arnold, 52 Wash. 2d 581, 328 P.2d 164 (1958) (negligent advice of attorney that no will
was necessary).
56. PROSSER, supra note 1, at 1000-01:
It'seems likely that any negligent misperformance of a contract by a public utility
or by one in a public calling, such as a lawyer, may be actionable by the person
in whose behalf the contract was made.... But if these are cases for liability,
the exception is a quite narrow one, turning on a special relationship or an
assumption of responsibility by the negligent promissor, and equally on the presence of a narrow and particular class of. potential plaintiffs.
57. See, e.g., Chameleon Eng'g Corp. v. Air Dynamics, Inc., 101 Cal. App. 3d 418, 161
Cal. Rptr. 463 (1980); Hawthorne v. Kober Constr. Co., 196 Mont. 519, 640 P.2d 467 (1982);
Keel v. Titan Constr. Co., 639 P.2d 1228 (Okla. 1982); c.f. Green Constr. Co. v. Williams
Form Eng'g Corp., 506 F. Supp. 173 (W.D. Mich. 1980); J'Aire Corp. v. Gregory, 24 Cal.
App. 3d 799, 598 P.2d 60, 157 Cal. Rptr. 407 (1979).
58. Connor v. Great Western Savings & Loan Ass'n, 69 Cal. 2d 850, 447 P.2d 609, 73
Cal. Rptr. 369 (1968).
59. Courts very early permitted recovery by the master for loss of services when his servant
was negligently injured. See infra note 63. Later courts permitted recovery by a husband for
loss of consortium (including loss of services) for injury to his wife. The emphasis in such
actions, however, has shifted away from loss of services toward a recognition of the more
intangible aspects of the relationships involved, such as companionship and affection. See
PROSSER, supra note 1, at 916, 931.
While these actions do involve recovery of economic losses in the absence of any physical
injury to the plaintiff, they are not really examples of recovery of pure economic loss because
they also involve injury to protected non-economic aspects of a relationship. Accordingly,
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recover damages for loss of consortium resulting from an injury to the other
spouse,60 and a parent can recover for the loss of services resulting from
injury to a child. 6' In some cases family members of the victim have also
recovered costs incurred in caring for the victim. 62 Likewise, courts, at one
time, permitted a master
to recover damages for loss of services due to
63
injury to a servant.
Another group of cases in which courts occasionally impose liability for
negligent injury to economic interests involves recovery by a private party
for damages resulting from a public nuisance. 64 A private party normally

recovery of economic loss in these cases might be explained on the basis that the defendant
has committed an independent tort for which the plaintiff may recover all damages proximately
caused including economic loss. See infra note 93. Still, the history of the action-which began
with recovery for loss of services and only later began to focus on the non-economic aspects
of these relationships-suggests that this kind of explanation is not the whole story.
60. An action in favor of the husband for loss of consortium resulting from injury to his
wife was recognized quite early. A similar action in favor of the wife was recognized only much
later. See generally PROSSER, supra note 1, at 931-34.
61. See generally PROSSER, supra note 1, at 934-35. Traditionally there was no reciprocal
action in favor of the child when a parent was injured. Recently, however, several courts have
rejected the traditional rule. Id. at 935, 936. See also Estate of Davis v. Hazen, 582 F. Supp.
938 (C.D. Ill. 1983); Weitl v. Moes, 311 N.W.2d 259 (Iowa 1981), rev'd, Audubon-Exira Ready
Mix, Inc. v. Illinois Central Gulf R.R. Co., 335 N.W.2d 148 (Iowa 1983); Ferriter v. Daniel
O'Connell's Sons, Inc., 381 Mass. 507, 413 N.E.2d 690 (1980); Berger v. Weber, 411 Mich.
1, 303 N.W.2d 424 (1981). But see Clark v. Romeo, 561 F. Supp. 1209 (D. Conn. 1983);
Block v. Pielet Bros. Scrap & Metal, 119 II1.App. 3d 983, 457 N.E.2d 509 (1983); Mueller v.
Hellrung Constr. Co., 107 Ill. App. 3d 337, 437 N.E.2d 789 (1982); Fayden v. Guerrero, 420
So. 2d 656 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982), petition denied, 430 So. 2d 450 (Fla. 1983); Salin v.
Kloempken, 322 N.W.2d 736 (Minn. 1982); Norwest v. Presbyterian Intercommunity Hosp.,
293 Or. 543, 652 P.2d 318 (1982).
62. See PROSSER, supra note 1, at 933-34.
63. This action was apparently based on the historically close relationship between master
and servant analogous in many ways to relationships among family members, and it has been
suggested that the disappearance of many of the special attributes of the master-servant relationship accounts for the general disappearance of the action as well. See, e.g., Myurgia
Perfumes, Inc. v. American Airlines, Inc., 68 Misc. 2d 712, 327 N.Y.S.2d 861 (N.Y. Civ. Ct.
1971); Hartridge v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 86 Wis. 2d 1, 271 N.W.2d 598 (1978);
see also Dobbs, Tortious Interference with ContractualRelationships, 34 ARK. L. REv. 335,
337-44 (1980); Perlman, Interference with Contract and OtherEconomic Expectancies: A Clash
of Tort and Contract Doctrine, 49 Cm. L. REv. 61, 73 (1982); Seavey, Liability to Master
for Negligent Harm to Servant, 1956 WAsH. U.L.Q. 309. See generally PROSsER, supra note
1, at 998-99.
64. PROSSER, supra note 1, at 997, suggests that recovery of economic damages in these
cases is not because the interference with the economic expectancy is actionable but rather
because the interference is simply an item of damages resulting from some other tort-here,
the commission of a public nuisance. The idea is the same as economic loss which is recovered
as parasitic damages where the plaintiff also suffers a physical injury. See infra note 93. There
is a difference, however, because where the plaintiff has also suffered a physical injury the
plaintiff has a cause of action and can recover something even if he does not recover the
economic loss. In the case of a public nuisance, on the other hand, the whole question is
whether the plaintiff will be entitled to recover anything at all. If the plaintiff is not permitted
to recover the economic loss, there is no other damage to the individual plaintiff that can be
recovered in these cases.
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cannot maintain an action for a public nuisance unless he suffers some
particular damage as distinguished from that suffered by the public in general. 65 However, pecuniary damage has been deemed sufficient in a number
of cases where, for example, the plaintiff has been disadvantaged in the
performance of a particular contract by the defendant's blockage of a public
highway or bridge.66
Finally, even in cases in which courts will not permit recovery of economic
losses on a negligence theory, recovery may still be available on some other
theory. In particular the doctrines of subrogation and third party beneficiaries
often permit recovery of economic loss in cases where such recovery would
be unavailable in negligence. For example, a defendant who negligently
destroys property is normally liable in negligence only to the owner of the
67
property and not to an insurance company which insures the property.
Nevertheless, the insurance company in such cases may be subrogated to the
68
insured's claim against the defendant and would thus be able to recover.

65. See generally PROSSER, supra note 1, at 646-52; Prosser, Private Action for Public
Nuisance, 52 VA. L. REv. 997 (1966).
66. See Holcomb Constr. Co. v. Armstrong, 590 F.2d 811 (9th Cir. 1979); Burgess v. M/
V Tamano, 370 F. Supp. 247 (D. Me. 1973); Brewer v. Missouri Pac. Ry. Co., 161 Ark. 525,
257 S.W.2d 53 (1923); Stop & Shop Co. v. Fisher, 387 Mass. 889, 444 N.E.2d 368 (1983); see
also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821C comment h, illustration 1 (1979).
67. Insurance Co. v. Brame, 95 U.S. 754, 758 (1877) ("The relation between the insurance
company and McLemore, the deceased, was created by a contract between them, to which
Brame [the person who killed the deceased] was not a party. The injury inflicted by him [Brame]
was upon McLemore, against his personal rights; that it happened to injure the plaintiff
[insurance company] was an incidental circumstance, a remote and indirect result, not necessarily
or legitimately resulting from the act of killing."); Connecticut Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. New
York & N.H. Ry., 25 Conn. 265 (1856) (insurance company has no direct right ol action against
negligent tortfeasor who injures the insured because its damages were too remote and indirect);
Peoria Marine and Fire Ins. Co. v. Frost, 37 Ill. 333 (1865) (insurance company cannot maintain
an action in its own name against tortfeasor who has damaged insured property in order to
recover for what it has paid the insurer); Economy Auto. Ins. Co. v. Brown, 334 Ill. App.
579, 79 N.E.2d 854 (1948) (plaintiff insurance company has no right of action under the Dram
Shop Act to recover against a tortfeasor who injured its insured because plaintiff's injuries
[property loss] were not proximately caused by the defendant's conduct).
In certain situations the insurance company may by subrogation have a claim against the
tortfeasor. See infra note 68. But in those circumstances the insurance company has an indirect
right of action which it acquires through the rights which the injured (insured) party had against
the wrongdoer. See J. DOBnYN, INsURaNcE LAW IN A NmTsHELL 227-36, 243-45 (1981); 2 F.
HARPER & F. JAMcs, Tn LAW OF TORTS § 6.10 (1956); R. KEETON, INSURANCE LAW BAsIc
TExT 151-52 (1971); J. MAY, MAY ON INSURANCE § 454 (4th ed. 1900); 4 0. PALMER, LAw OF
RESTTUTnON 464 n.22 (1978); W. VANCE, INSURANCE 679 (2d ed. 1930).
68. Subrogation is an equitable principle which allows an insurer to step into the shoes of
the insured party and to enforce the insured party's rights and remedies against the person
causing the loss. It is of two types: conventional, pertaining to an express subrogation as where
the insurer and insured provide for subrogation in the insurance contract; and legal, which is
effected or implied by operation of law. BLACK'S LAW DicTioNARY 807, 1279 (5th ed. 1979).
Thus, where an insurance company pays its insured for property losses caused by a negligent
tortfeasor, it may succeed by subrogation to its insured's right of action against that tortfeasor.
The availability of legal subrogation in a given case depends largely upon the type of insurance
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Rules permitting third party beneficiaries to enforce contracts can also provide a means for a party to recover for negligently inflicted economic losses.
In one case 69 the defendant contracted with a city to renovate a portion of
the city's downtown area. This contract between the defendant and the city
required the defendant to take certain precautions to minimize disruption
to businesses in the renovation area. The plaintiff brought an action against
the defendant alleging that the defendant negligently failed to take the
precautions required in the contract resulting in a loss of business to the
plaintiff. The court specifically held that the plaintiff could not recover in
negligence because the damages were purely economic. 70 However, the court
also held that the plaintiff was a third party beneficiary of the contract
between the defendant and the city, and that as such could bring an action
directly against the defendant for breach of contract. 7'
Although economic loss may sometimes be recovered under one of the
exceptions to the rule or on some theory other than negligence, courts are
generally much less willing to impose liability for the economic consequences
of negligent acts than for the physical consequences of such acts. One
explanation sometimes offered for this difference in treatment between economic loss and physical injury is that the integrity of the body and tangible
property is more important than the integrity of intangible economic interests
and that economic interests are simply not worthy of protection, at least
against mere negligence.7 2 One difficulty with this explanation is that courts
do in fact protect economic interests against negligence in a number of
circumstances. Moreover, even assuming that interests in physical security
are of a higher order than interests in economic security, it does not necessarily follow that economic interests are unworthy of protection. If economic injury is not worthy. of redress, there must be some explanation.
Nevertheless, the only explanation offered by many courts is that there is
7
no general duty to avoid negligent injury to the economic interests of others,

involved. Subrogation rights are generally recognized in property and liability insurance cases,
and are generally not recognized in life or accident insurance. Between these two extremes,
jurisdictions vary when it comes to medical-related insurance and workman's compensation
insurance. R. KEETON, supra note 67, at 147-53. See generally D. DOBBS, REMEDIES 250-52
(1973); J. DOBBYN, supra note 67, at 227-36, 243-45; R. KEETON, supra note 67, § 3.10; G.
PALMER, supra note 67, at 345-76.
Professor Keeton points out that in some instances the insurer may be able to recover
against the policy holder but not against the third party tortfeasor.
69. Just's, Inc. v. Arrington Constr. Co., 99 Idaho 462, 583 P.2d 997 (1978).
70. Id.at 1005-06.
71. Id.at 1002.
72. See, e.g., James, supra note 22, at 54 n.45: "A number of participants in the London
workshop also felt that the integrity of the body and . . .of tangible property are entitled
to a higher priority in the scale of man's proper value than the integrity of intangible wealth."
73. See, e.g., Union Oil Co. v. Oppen, 501 F.2d 558, 563 (9th Cir. 1974); The Federal No.
2, 21 F.2d 313 (2d Cir. 1927); Byrd v. English, 117 Ga. 191, 43 S.E. 419 (1903); Chelsea
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or that the damages were not proximately caused 74 or that they were too
remote. 75 Such explanations, of course, do little more than beg the question.
The notion that economic interests are not worthy of protection may
reflect a rather different idea-not that economic injuries are not of sufficient
concern to merit redress, but rather that some conduct should be protected
despite the fact that it causes economic harm. For example, if A opens a
business and competes with B, this may have a detrimental impact on B's
business prospects, but A's conduct is not actionable.7 6 It is not that the
damage to B is not important, but that the social utility of A's activity is
deemed to outweigh the impact on B. Consequently, even conduct which-

intentionally n interferes with the economic interests of others is actionable
only when "improper. ' 78 This concern may not have much applicability to
negligent infliction of economic harm, however, because negligent conduct,
almost by definition, lacks the social utility to merit protection.
Perhaps the most satisfactory explanation for the reluctance to permit
recovery for negligent infliction of economic harm is what Professor James
has called the pragmatic objection to liability. 79 Professor James noted that
as a practical matter the physical consequences of negligence are usually

Moving & Trucking Co. v. Ross Towboat Co., 280 Mass. 282, 182 N.E. 477 (1932); Brink v.
Wabash R.R., 160 Mo. 87, 60 S.W. 1058 (1901); Mandal v. Hoffman Constr. Co., 527 P.2d
387 (Or. 1974).
74. See, e.g., Union Oil Co. v. Oppen, 501 F.2d 558, 563 (9th Cir. 1974); The Federal No.
2, 21 F.2d 313 (2d Cir. 1927); Byrd v. English, 117 Ga. 191, 43 S.E. 419 (1903); Chelsea
Moving & Trucking Co. v. Ross Towboat Co., 280 Mass. 282, 182 N.E. 144 (1932); Rickards
v. Sun Oil Co., 23 N.J. Misc. 89, 41 A.2d 267 (1945); La Societe Anonyme de Remorguage
a Helice v. Bennets [1911] 1 K.B. 243 (1910).
75. See, e.g., Robins Dry Dock & Repair Co. v. Flint, 275 U.S. 303 (1927); Union Oil Co.
v. Oppen, 501 F.2d 558, 563 (9th Cir. 1974); Sinram v. Penn. Ry., 61 F.2d 767 (2d Cir. 1932);
Cain v. Vollmer, 19 Idaho 163, 112 P. 686 (1910); Anthoney v. Slaid, 52 Mass. (11 Met.) 290
(1846); Northern States Contracting Co. v. Oakes, 191 Minn. 88, 253 N.W. 371 (1934); Brink
v. Wabash R.R., 160 Mo. 87, 60 S.W. 1058 (1901); Dunlop Tire & Rubber Corp. v. FMC
Corp., 53 A.D.2d 1250, 385 N.Y.S.2d 971 (1976).
76. See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 768 illustration 1 (1979).
77. In the example just given, A's conduct might be said to be intentional, not in the sense
that A's primary purpose was to interfere with B's business prospects, but rather in the sense
that, although the interference was incidental to A's primary purpose, it was known by A to
be a necessary consequence of his actions. See id. § 766 comment j.
78. See id. §§ 766, 767. See generally PROSSER, supra note 1, at 982-89. Two recent articles
have suggested that the tort of interference with contract or other economic relations be even
more narrowly restricted to cases in which the defendant's acts are independently unlawful.
Dobbs, Tortious Interference with Contractual Relationships, 34 ARK. L. REv. 335 (1980);
Perlman, Interference with Contractsand Other Economic Expectancies: A Clash of Tort and
Contract Doctrine, 49 U. Cm. L. REv. 61 (1982). Professor Perlman notes particularly that
current tort doctrine sometimes imposes liability for interference with contract on the basis that
the intent or the result of a defendant's conduct was to disrupt a particular contractual
relationship, even where the defendant's actions were otherwise lawful. Professor Perman
suggests that such liability is somewhat inconsistent with an economic system based on competition, and moreover, is inconsistent with the objective of efficiency which is promoted by
the general scheme of contract remedies. Id. at 78-91.
79. James, supra note 22.

INDIANA LA W JOURNAL[

6
[Vol. 61:593

limited, but that "the indirect economic repercussions of negligence may be
far wider, indeed virtually open-ended." 0 The physical consequences of an
automobile accident, for example, are necessarily restricted to persons and
property within some limited physical proximity. However, no such inherent
limitation exists with respect to the economic consequences. Instead, the
physical injuries suffered by the initial victims could set off a chain reaction
of economic repercussions extending to an unlimited number of parties. As
a result, liability for the economic consequences of negligence raises the fear
of "liability in an indeterminate amount for an indeterminate time to an
indeterminate class.''81
The pragmatic concern with such open-ended liability is, of course, that
it could unduly inhibit useful activity.8 2 To the extent that such liability
would inhibit negligent conduct, it would be desirable. However, the problem
is that because the line between negligent and non-negligent conduct is not
a clear one, there would be a substantial chilling effect on non-negligent
conduct as well. 3

80. Id. at 45. The existence of inherent limitations to the extent of physical damages and
the lack of any such inherent limitations with respect to the extent of economic damages has
been noted by others. See Perlman, supra note 63, at 71-72; Comment, Foreseeabilityof Third
Party Economic Injuries-A Problem in Analysis, 20 U. Cm. L. REv. 283 (1953).
81. Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 255 N.Y. 170, 179, 174 N.E. 441, 444 (1931). The fear
of unpredictable liability has been a constant theme in judicial decisions and commentary
dealing with problems of economic loss. See, e.g., Louisiana ex rel. Guste v. M/V Testbank,
752 F.2d 1019, 1028-29 (5th Cir. 1985); Isbrandtsun Co. v. Local 1291, 204 F.2d 495, 498 (3d
Cir. 1943); Darmour Prods. Corp. v. Herbert M. Baruch Corp., 135 Cal. App. 351, 27 P.2d
664 (1933); Connecticut Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. New York & N.H. Ry., 25 Conn. 265, 275
(1856); Byrd v. English, 117 Ga. 191, 43 S.E. 419 (1903); Economy Auto Ins. Co. v. Brown,
334 Ill. App. 579, 79 N.E.2d 854 (1948); Weller & Co. v. Foot & Mouth Disease Research
Inst. [1966] 1 Q.B. 569, 577; Cattle v. Stockton Waterworks Co., [1875] 10 L.R.-Q.B. 453,
457; see also Union Oil Co. v. Oppen, 501 F.2d 558, 563 (9th Cir. 1974).
For commentary that discusses this justification, see FLEmING, Tnm LAW OF TORTS 182-84
(1957); James, supra note 22, at 45; Comment, Negligent Interference with Economic Expectancy: A Case for Recovery, 16 STAN. L. Ray. 664, 679 (1964); Comment, Liability for Negligent
Interference with ContractRelations, 23 CAL. L. REv. 420, 427 (1935); Comment, Foreseeability
of Third-Party Economic Injuries-A Problem in Analysis, 20 U. Cm. L. REv. 283, 286, 295
n.71, 298 (1953).
82. See, e.g., Just's, Inc. v. Arrington Constr. Co., 99 Idaho 462, 470, 583 P.2d 997, 1005
(1978) ("the common underlying pragmatic consideration is that a contrary rule, which would
allow compensation for losses of economic advantage caused by the defendant's negligence,
would impose too heavy and unpredictable a burden on the defendant's conduct"); see also
RESTATEMNT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 766C comment a (Tent. Draft No. 23, 1977) ("the fear of
an undue burden upon the defendant's freedom of action" is one of the factors that have led
courts to refuse protection against negligent interference with economic interests).
83. See Perlman, supra note 63, at 70-71. The author also makes the point that the chilling
effect problem takes on an added significance where, as is often the case, the conduct causing
economic loss consists of expression. Id. at 74; see also New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S.
254, 279-80 (1964).
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Courts have responded to these fears by formulating rules excluding liability in whole classes of cases involving economic lOSS, 4 thereby avoiding
the case by case analysis applicable in cases of physical injury.85 Formulation
of these rules in terms of economic loss, however, appears merely to reflect
the fact that the economic consequences of negligence are often more widespread than the physical consequences . 6 In circumstances where that generalization does not hold true, courts often react differently. In cases in
which the physical consequences of negligence are more widespread, such
as mass fire cases, courts have reacted as they have in the economic loss
cases and employed restrictive rules of liability.8 7 Conversely, in cases in

84. See supra note 22.
85. These rules also serve institutional needs of the courts. The potential for economic loss
to occur in a chain reaction with more and more victims being brought into the fray makes it
difficult for courts to articulate any sensible stopping point for liability. Courts want rules that
can be applied consistently and articulated sensibly to guide future cases to avoid the appearance
of arbitrariness. See Perlman, supra note 63, at 71.
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in Louisiana ex rel. Guste v. M/V Testbank,
752 F.2d 1019, 1028-29 (5th Cir. 1985), in denying recovery for economic losses emphasized
that:
Those who would delete the requirement of physical damage have no rule or
principle to substitute. Their approach fails to recognize limits upon the adjudicating ability of courts. We do not mean just the ability to supply a judgment;
prerequisite to this adjudicatory function are preexisting rules, whether the creature
of courts or legislatures. Courts can decide cases without preexisting normative
guidance but the result becomes less judicial and more the product of managerial,
legislative or negotiated function ....
The point is not that such a process cannot
be administered but rather that its judgments would be much less the products
of determinable rule of law. In this important sense, the resulting decisions would
be judicial only in their draw upon judicial resources.
86. A similar observation is made by Judge Wisdom in his dissent in Testbank, 752 F.2d
at 1044. See also James, supra note 22, at 50-51 where he says "all this suggests that the
prevailing distinction between indirect economic loss and physical damage is probably a crude
and unreliable one that may need reexamination if a limitation on liability for pragmatic reasons
is to be retained."
87. See James, supra note 22, at 50. Some courts have imposed specialized rules to limit
liability. In New York, for example, the rule in fire cases is that a negligent tortfeasor's liability
extends only to the fire and damage of the structure nearest (adjacent) to the property where
the fire first broke out. See PROSSER, supra note 1, at 282-83 & cases cited n.18. Prosser notes
that the rule has been relaxed a little in recent cases, id. at n.18, bht nevertheless New York
still stands out as the only jurisdiction that employs a more specialized rule in fire cases to
limit liability.
Another area where the courts have been quick to restrict liability are cases involving a
water company which contracts with a city to supply water to the public, but fails to do'so
when it is needed, and a private citizen's house is destroyed by fire. In H.R. Moch Co. v.
Rensselaer Water Co., 247 N.Y. 160, 159 N.E. 896 (1928), Chief Justice Cardozo.of the New
York Court of Appeals observed that:
liability would be unduly and indeed indefinitely extended by this enlargement of
the zone of duty.... Everyone making a promise having the quality of a contract
will be under a duty to the promisee by virtue of the promise, but [will also be]
under another duty, apart from contract, to an indefinite number of potential
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which courts have been able to articulate manageable limits for liability,
they have been willing to impose liability even for purely economic loss. ss

beneficiaries when performance has begun. The assumption of one relation will
mean the involuntary assumption of a series of new relations, inescapably hooked
together. Again we may say in the words of the Supreme Court of the United
States, "The law does not spread its protection so far."
Id. at 168, 159 N.E. at 899 (quoting Robins Dry Dock & Repair Co. v. Flint, 275 U.S. 303,
309 (1927)).
According to Prosser, similar rules of nonliability have been applied in cases involving
interruption of gas or electricity:
But the imposition of tort liability on those who must render continuous service
of this kind ... could be ruinous and the expense of litigating and settling claims
over the issue of whether or not there was negligence could be a greater burden
to the rate payer than can be socialy justified. This is the more important question.
PROSSER, supra note I, at 671.
Congress has also addressed the problem of indefinite and excessive liability through various
legislation. The Price Anderson Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2210-22 (1982), for example, was enacted
"to assure that funds are available to pay liability claims in the event of a catastrophic nuclear
accident, and ... to protect the nuclear industry against unlimited liability if such an event were
to occur." S. REP. No. 454, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1975). The statutory provisions allow a
plaintiff to recover under a strict liability theory only in the event of a statutorily defined
"extraordinary nuclear occurrence." Other nuclear accidents, however, that do not rise to the
level of an "extraordinary nuclear occurrence" require a suit under common law tort or other
applicable state law in order to obtain recovery. As one commentator describes it, the Price
Anderson Act
adopts a restrictive approach toward compensation. The mandatory waiver provisions only apply in the event of an 'extraordinary nuclear occurrence.' In the
absence of such an event plaintiffs are forced to sue under the common law. The
difficulties attendant in maintaining such actions have been widely noted. Among
these difficulties are requirements related to showing cause in fact, proximate
cause, compensable injuries and timeliness of suit.
Trauberman, Compensating Victims of Toxic Substances, 5 HARv. ENvTL. L. REv. 1, 14 (1981).
Another commentator on a related problem, exposure to low level radiation, has argued
that the courts ought to employ a more rigid test of proximate cause (and/or a higher standard
of care) in order to limit liability for low level radiation injuries, liability which in his view
might spread too far under current judicial standards. Keys & Howarth, Approaches to Liability
for Remote Causes: The Low Level Radiation Example, 56 IowA L. REv. 531, 547-48 (1971).
The Limitation of Liability Act, 46 U.S.C. §§ 181-89 (1982) limits the liability of the owner
of any vessel to "the amount or value of the interest of [the] owner in [the] vessel, and her
freight then pending," if the damage is incurred "without the privity or knowledge of [the]
owner or owners." Id. § 183(a). As one commentator remarked,
The Limitation Act extends to tort claims for damages to shorebased property,
and applies even where the tort is non-maritime in nature. While the statute is
neutral on its face, it is now well established by judicial interpretation that the
value of the vessel is determined after the loss rather than at the commencement
of the voyage. Moreover, insurance proceeds carried by the owner are not recoverable by the claimant. Thus, when a tanker carrying millions of gallons of
oil runs aground or collides with another vessel, discharges its cargo into the
ocean, and then sinks, the value of the ship is reduced to zero, and under the
Limitation Act plaintiffs will be unable to obtain any monetary recovery.
Comment, Private Action for Damages Resulting from Offshore Oil Pollution, 2 CoLUM. J.
ENvxTL. LAW 140, 148 (1975).
88. This observation has been made by others. See James, supra note 22, at 50, where he

1986]

NEGLIGENCE AND THE U.C.C

Indeed, each of the groups of cases discussed above, in which courts do
impose liability for negligent infliction of economic harm, is defined in such
a way to confine liability within manageable limits by limiting the class of
potential plaintiffs. One exception operates in favor only of plaintiffs having
a special relationship to the defendant, 9 another in favor only of plaintiffs
having a special relationship to the initial victim of the defendant's negligence. 90 Another restricts liability for public nuisance to those plaintiffs who
suffer particular damage as opposed to that suffered by the community in
general. 9' Still another exception operates in favor only of plaintiffs who
suffer physical damage as well as economic loss, thus tying recovery of
economic loss to the usually less open-ended chain of physical causation. 92
These limitations all serve to diminish or eliminate the problem of openended liability and thus provide functional substitutes for the limitations
inherent in physical damage cases. 93

states: "On the other hand, there are some situations in which economic loss-or at least a
given type of economic loss-indirectly caused by negligence is not only foreseeable, but also
just as limited as the physical consequences would be. To a certain extent the present law
accommodates these facts." (citations omitted); see also Perlman, supra note 63, at 73-75;
Comment, Negligent Interference with Economic Expectancy: The Case for Recovery, 16 STAN.
L. Ray. 664, 691 (1964).
89. See supra notes 37-58 and accompanying text. The special relationship cases tend to
limit liability to only those plaintiffs with whom the defendant was in privity of contract, or
who could recover anyway on a third party beneficiary theory, or who were specifically foreseen
rather than merely foreseeable.
90. See supra notes 59-63 and accompanying text. These cases tend to be limited to recovery
by family members of the initial victims. See Perlman, supra note 63, at 73.
91. See supra notes 64-66 and accompanying text. The number of parties suffering similar
damage (i.e.-the number of potential plaintiffs) is sometimes an explicit consideration in
deciding whether a particular party can recover. See, e.g., Stop & Shop Co. v. Fisher, 387
Mass. 889, 897, 444 N.E.2d 368, 373 (1983):
The plaintiff must suffer special pecuniary harm from the loss of access. Severe
pecuniary loss is usually a special type of harm, but if a whole community suffers
such loss, then it becomes a public wrong and the plaintiff cannot recover....
Thus, the question becomes whether so many businesses have suffered the same
economic harm that the plaintiff's damages are no longer special.
Id. (citations omitted); see also RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF ToRts § 821C comment h (1979);
Prosser, Private Action for Public Nuisance, 52 VA. L. REv. 997, 1013-16 (1966).
92. See supra notes 35-36 and accompanying text; see also Comment, supra note 88, at
691.
93. Prosser notes that the exceptions for cases in which the plaintiff suffers some physical
injury in addition to an economic loss and for cases in which a private plaintiff is permitted
to recover for damages resulting from a public nuisance may be explained on the basis that
the defendant has committed some independent tort. PROSSER, supra note 1, at 997. See supra
note 64. In other words, although there is no general duty to avoid injury to economic interests,
when such damage results from breach of some other duty it is recoverable. However, to some
extent this explanation begs the question because it does not explain why, in view of the lack
of any general duty to avoid economic injury to others, such injury should be a compensable
item of damage when it happens to occur as a result of a breach of a duty to avoid injury to
some other interest. Thus, the fact that limitation of recovery of economic loss to cases in
which there is an independent tort limits the class of potential plaintiffs provides a more
satisfactory explanation for the recoverability of economic loss as parasitic damages in such
cases.
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The doctrines of subrogation and third party beneficiaries, which sometimes serve to circumvent the rules restricting recovery of economic loss in
tort, 94 also serve to restrict liability. Under the Restatement (Second) of
Contracts, liability to third party beneficiaries is limited to "intended beneficiaries" and does not extend to "incidental beneficiaries. ' 95 In subrogation, the plaintiff is subrogated to the rights of another. 9 Such cases
involve only one loss and the question is simply whether the plaintiff or the
original victim should be the one to recover. 97 Thus, subrogation cases do
not raise any potential for liability to an unlimited class of plaintiffs.
Although recovery of economic loss has generally been limited to circumstances in which the potential for open-ended liability can be avoided, there
are a few recent cases that suggest a more relaxed judicial attitude toward
the problem of indefinite liability, or at least a greater willingness to deal
with it on a case by case basis. A number of courts, as already noted, have
held accountants liable for losses suffered by third parties in reliance on
negligently prepared financial statements.9" For the most part, however, such
liability has been extended only to third parties whose losses were not only
foreseeable, but actually foreseen. 99 This restriction serves to avoid problems
of indefinite liability. However, in two recent cases, Rosenblum v. Adler' ®
and Citizens State Bank v. Timm, Schmidt & Co., 0°1 the New Jersey and
Wisconsin Supreme Courts respectively refused to restrict liability to specifically foreseen plaintiffs, holding instead that liability should extend to
virtually all foreseeable plaintiffs. 1 2 The Wisconsin court stated specifically
that liability of accountants for economic loss suffered by third parties should
be governed by the general principles of Wisconsin negligence law according
to which a tortfeasor is fully liable for all foreseeable consequences of his
negligence, unless under the facts of a particular case liability is denied on
grounds of public policy. 03 Among the factors mentioned by the court to
be considered on a case by case basis as matters of public policy were
whether the injury is wholly out of proportion to the culpability of the
defendant; whether allowance of recovery would place too unreasonable a

94. See supra notes 67-71 and accompanying text.
95. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 302, 304 (1981).
96. See supra notes 67, 68; PROSSER, supra note 1, at 999. See generally D. DOBBS, REMEDIES
§ 4.3, at 250-52 (1973); F. DOBBYN, INSURANCE LAW IN A NUTSHELL 227-45 (1981); R. KEETON,
INSURANCE LAW BASIC TEXT 147-68 (1971); 4 G. PALMER, LAW OF RESTITUTION 345-76 (1978);
I.M. TAYLOR, THE LAW OF INSURANCE 21-22 (1983).
97. PROSSER, supra note 1, at 999.
98. See supra note 48.
99. See supra note 53.
100. 93 N.J. 324, 461 A.2d 138 (1983).
101. 113 Wis. 2d 376, 335 N.W.2d 361 (1983).
102. Rosenblum, 93 N.J. at 348-53, 461 A.2d at 151-53; Citizens State Bank, 113 Wis. 2d
at 386-87, 335 N.W.2d at 366.
103. Citizens State Bank, 113 Wis. 2d at 386-87, 335 N.W.2d at 366.
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burden on the defendant; and whether allowance of recovery would enter a
field that has no sensible or just stopping point.e4 Thus the problems associated with indeterminate liability are still to be considered, but on a case
by case basis.
In an opinion of potentially broader applicability, the California Supreme
Court indicated its willingness to deal with problems of indefinite liability
on a case by case basis. In J'Aire Corp. v. GregoryOs the defendant negligently failed to complete a construction project in a timely manner thereby
forcing the plaintiff, a lessee who operated a restaurant in the premises
involved, to remain closed longer than would otherwise have been the case.
The trial court sustained a demurrer to plaintiff's claim for lost profits, but
the California Supreme Court reversed and held that there was no' absolute
bar to recovery for negligent interference with prospective economic advantage.1 6 The court acknowledged the problems associated with indeterminate
liability, but concluded that a case by case consideration of such factors as
the foreseeability of the injury and the nexus between the defendant's conduct
and the plaintiff's injury, together with ordinary principles of tort law, are
fully adequate to limit liability without resort to an absolute rule.1°7
Several maritime decisions also point in the same direction. In In re
Kinsman Transit Company'"' the court, in denying recovery for damages
resulting from a blockage of the Buffalo River, rejected any absolute rule
prohibiting recovery for negligent interference with contract. Instead, the
court chose to apply normal tort principles and concluded that, on the facts
of that case, the connection between the defendant's negligence and the
plaintiffs' damages was too tenuous to permit recovery.
More recently, in Union Oil Co. v. Oppen,'09 the plaintiffs, commercial
fishermen, suffered losses as a result of an oil spill which diminished the
quantity of aquatic life in the Santa Barbara Channel. The court acknowledged the general rule that negligent interference with prospective economic
advantage is not actionable, but nevertheless refused defendants' request for
partial summary judgment. In effect the court held that the defendants'

104. Id.
105. 24 Cal. 3d 799, 598 P.2d 60, 157 Cal. Rptr. 407 (1979).
106. Id. at 808, 598 P.2d at 65-66, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 412-13. The Court said: "These factors
[i.e., those enumerated in the Biakanja case, 49 Cal. 2d 647, 320 P.2d 16 (1958)] and ordinary
principles of tort law such as proximate cause are fully adequate to limit recovery without the
drastic consequences of an absolute rule which bars recovery in all such cases [where economic
interests are harmed]. Following these principles, recovery for negligent interference with prospective economic advantage will be limited to instances where the risk of harm is foreseeable
and is closely connected with the defendant's conduct, where damages are not wholly speculative
and the injury is not part of the plaintiff's ordinary business risk." Gregory, 24 Cal. 3d at
808, 598 P.2d at 65-66, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 412-13 (citations omitted).
107. Id.
108. 388 F.2d 821 (2d Cir. 1968).
109. 501 F.2d 558 (9th Cir. 1974).
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alleged negligent conduct was actionable because plaintiffs' alleged injury
was a foreseeable consequence of that conduct, thus applying general principles of negligence law even though plaintiffs' injuries were purely economic." 0
On the other hand, the court noted that plaintiffs as commercial fishermen
made direct use of the sea in the ordinary course of their business, and
carefully stated that it did not mean to open the door to claims by other
parties who might have suffered economic losses as a result of the oil spill."
Thus, although the court spoke in terms of foreseeability, the opinion strongly
suggests that the court would restrict liability short of the limits of foresee2
ability, perhaps to those who make direct uses of the sea."
Another recent case involving similar facts forced the court to confront
the problem of indefinite liability more directly. In Pruittv. Allied Chemical
Corp.,"' the defendants were allegedly responsible for chemical pollution of
the James River and the Chesapeake Bay. Plaintiffs included commercial

fishermen, seafood wholesalers, retailers, restaurateurs, marina operators,
boat owners, tackle and bait shop owners, and others, all of whom claimed
that the pollution in some way caused them economic loss. The defendant,
relying on Union Oil Co. v. Oppen,' ' 4 urged the court to limit its liability
to those who exploited the Bay directly. The court observed, however, that
no sharp distinction existed between those who relied on the Bay directly
and those who relied on the Bay only indirectly, but rather that the different
groups of plaintiffs depended on the Bay in varying degrees of immediacy."'
Moreover, the court noted that, as one traced the stream of profits flowing

110. Id. at 569. "[W]e can not escape the conclusion that under California law the presence
of a duty on the part of the defendants in this case would turn substantially on foreseeability.
That being the crucial determinant, the question must be asked whether the defendants could
reasonably have foreseen that negligently conducted drilling operations might diminish aquatic
life and thus injure the business of commercial fishermen. We believe the answer is yes." Id.
However, the court also hinted at two other possible explanations for its result. The court,
citing Carbone v. Ursich, 209 F.2d 178 (9th Cir. 1953), noted that recovery for pure economic
loss has been recognized in maritime settings. Union Oil Co., 501 F.2d at 567. Also the court
recognized that recovery might be proper on the theory that defendant's activities constituted
a public nuisance and that plaintiffs had a sufficiently particular injury to be able to bring a
private action for recovery. Id. at 570. As a result of these suggestions, the basis of the holding
in Union Oil has been a subject of dispute. Compare the majority opinion in Louisiana ex rel.
Guste v. M/V Testbank, 752 F.2d 1019 (5th Cir. 1985) which takes the position that the holding
in Union Oil is based on the historical protection of fishermen's interests under maritime law,
id. at 1026, with Judge Wisdom's dissent in the same case which points out that, although
Union Oil extended protection only to commercial fishermen, the court's emphasis was on the
factor of foreseeability. Id. at 1043 (Wisdom, J., dissenting).
111. 501 F.2d at 570-71.
112. This limitation has been criticized on the basis that the court did not satisfactorily
explain any reason for permitting recovery by the plaintiffs and denying it to others. See
Perlman, supra note 63, at 72 n.64.
113. 523 F. Supp. 975 (E.D. Va. 1981).
114. 501 F.2d 558 (9th Cir. 1974).
115. Pruitt, 523 F. Supp. at 978-79.
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from the Bay's seafood, the set of potential plaintiffs became almost infinite.
Accordingly, the court acknowledged a need to impose some limit upon the
defendant's potential liability, but confessed that it had no articulable reason
for excluding any particular group of plaintiffs." 6 Ultimately the court held
that the losses suffered by those who purchased and marketed seafood from
commercial fishermen were not actionable, because they were insufficiently
direct, but that the losses suffered by commercial fishermen and by boat,
tackle and bait shop, and marina owners were actionable. The court described
its resolution of7 the case as "an attempt to tailor justice to the facts of the
'
instant case. ""
These cases should not necessarily be taken to indicate a trend. Indeed,
in another maritime case involving a chemical spill, the fifth circuit, sitting
en banc, recently rejected the case by case approach and reaffirmed the rule
that there could be no recovery for negligent infliction of economic loss
without accompanying physical damage." 8
Although the future of the traditional rules precluding liability for negligent
infliction of solely economic loss is uncertain, courts have applied them with
particular strictness in the products liability area. 1 9 Yet, perhaps ironically,
the most persuasive justifications for the general rule-the problems associated with indefinite liability-are conspicuously inapplicable to products
cases. Even with respect to remote purchasers, the number of potential
plaintiffs who could directly suffer economic losses as a result of a defective
product is limited by the number of defective products sold. Thus the absence
of any doctrine permitting recovery even by parties who purchase defective
products directly from the manufacturer is striking. This is particularly so
in view of the exceptions in other cases where the problems of indefinite
liability are not present.' 2° Moreover, at least with respect to parties in privity
of contract, the rule in products cases contrasts sharply with the rule in
cases involving service transactions where courts often impose liability on
the basis of the relationship between parties.'12 Although the rule in products
cases is consistent in its result with -the general rule denying recovery for
negligent infliction of economic loss, the policy considerations which justify
the general rule are not applicable in the products context, at least in cases

116. Id. at 980.
117. Id.
118. Louisiana ex rel. Guste v. M/V Testbank, 752 F.2d 1019 (5th Cir. 1985). The court,
however, was divided. Five judges joined in a dissent authored by Judge Wisdom urging the
court to adopt a case by case approach rather than a blanket rule.
119. See supra notes 32-34 and accompanying text; see also infra notes 122-45 and accompanying text.
120. See supra notes 88-93 and accompanying text.
121. See supra notes 37-46 and accompanying text; see also infra notes 191-204 and accompanying text.
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where the parties are in privity of contract. Consequently, justification for
the rule in products cases must be sought elsewhere.
II.

THE GENERAL RULE-PRODUCTS CASES

The general rule that negligent injury to purely economic interests is not
actionable operates to deny liability in products cases perhaps more frequently than in any other kind of case. When a product fails to work
properly and causes economic damage to the buyer or user but does not
cause any other damage, an overwhelming majority of courts have refused
to permit recovery in tort.'2
Virtually every discussion of this subject begins with the case of Seely v.
White Motor Co.' 23 Ironically, however, Seely reaches this question only in
dictum. In Seely the plaintiff purchased, through a dealer, a truck manufactured by the defendant. The truck proved to be defective in that it had
a problem referred to as "galloping." The dealer made numerous attempts
to correct the "galloping" but was unsuccessful. In addition, on one occasion, which the trial court found to be an unrelated incident, the brakes
failed and the truck overturned.' 24 Sometime after having had the accident
damage repaired, the plaintiff refused to make further payments on the truck
because the "galloping," problem had never been solved. Thereupon the
dealer repossessed and resold the truck. The plaintiff then brought suit
against both the dealer and White seeking return of the money he paid on
the truck, lost profits resulting from his inability to use the truck during
the dealer's unsuccessful attempts to eliminate the "galloping" and the cost
25
of repairing the truck following the accident.'
The trial court found that the "galloping" constituted a breach of an
express warranty, and on that basis awarded damages to the plaintiff for
the money he paid for the truck and for lost profits.'1 However, the court
denied recovery for the costs of repairing the accident damage because the
27
plaintiff failed to prove that the accident was caused by the "galloping."'
On appeal, the California Supreme Court affirmed the trial court in a
well-known opinion by Justice Traynor. 28 In the course of that opinion the
court considered the applicability of strict tort liability to the case. The court
held that the cost of repairing the truck following the accident, although a

122. See supra notes 7, 32.
123. 63 Cal. 2d 9, 403 P.2d 145, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17 (1965).
124. The court found that the plaintiff had not proved that the accident was caused by the
galloping. Id. at 13, 403 P.2d at 148, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 20.
125. Id. at 12-13, 403 P.2d at 147-48, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 19-20.
126. Id. at 13, 403 P.2d at 148, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 20.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 19, 403 P.2d at 152, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 20.
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type of damage recoverable in strict tort liability generally, 29 could not be
recovered in that case because there had been no showing that the accident

was caused by the defect in the truck. 30 With respect to the other items of
damage, the court held that they could not be recovered in strict tort liability
because they were commercial losses rather than personal injury or physical
damage to property.'' In support of this distinction between "tort recovery
for physical injuries and warranty recovery for economic loss," the court
asserted that "[e]ven in actions for negligence, a manufacturer's liability is
limited to damages for physical injuries and there is no recovery for economic
loss alone."' 3 2 In the twenty years since the Seely decision, this dictum has been
cited so frequently to deny tort recovery of economic loss in products cases
that it seems almost to be the foundation of the rule.
Clark v. InternationalHarvester Co.' 33 is typical of the recent cases following the Seely dictum. In Clark the plaintiff, a farmer, purchased through
one of the defendant's dealers a tractor manufactured by the defendant.
Subsequently, the plaintiff experienced numerous problems with the tractor
costing the plaintiff in excess of $2,000 in repair costs and over $24,000 in
lost profits due to plaintiff's inability to use the tractor. 34 Plaintiff then
brought suit against defendant alleging both breach of warranty and negligent
manufacture and design of the tractor. The trial court granted summary
judgment dismissing the breach of warranty claim. 35 On the negligence count,

129. The court stated, "plaintiff contends that, even though the law of warranty governs
the economic relations between the parties, the doctrine of strict liability in tort should be
extended to govern physical injury to plaintiff's property, as well as personal injury. We agree
with this contention. Physical injury to property is so akin to personal injury that there is no
reason for distinguishing them." Id. at 19, 403 P.2d at 152, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 24 (citations
omitted). This was an early statement of what has come to be the prevalent position with
respect to strict tort liability. Where courts differ significantly however, is with respect to
whether the property damage must be to other property or whether damage to the defective
product itself is sufficient. Even where courts permit recovery for damage to the defective
product itself, however, there is a further dispute as to whether that damage must occur as
the result of a traumatic accident or whether slow deterioration would suffice. See supra note
8.
130. Seely, 63 Cal. 2d at 19, 403 P.2d at 152, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 24.
131. Id. at 18-19, 403 P.2d at 151-52, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 23-24.
132. Id. at 18, 403 P.2d at 151, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 23. It has been noted that the authority
for this proposition was rather scant at the time Justice Traynor wrote the Seely opinion. In
Franklin, When Worlds Collide: Liability Theoriesand Disclaimersin Defective-ProductCases,
18 STAN. L. REy. 974 (1966), the author states, "[b]ut even calling this [the rule against recovery
and negligence for economic loss in products cases] a 'doctrine' overstates it, for the body of
law is really found in a New York trial court opinion and in one intermediate California
opinion-not the sort of authority Justice Traynor usually accepts without question." Id. at
1003. The two cases in question are Wyatt v. Cadillac Motor Car Div., 145 Cal. App. 2d 423,
302 P.2d 665 (1956), rev'd in part, Sabella v. Westler, 59 Cal. 2d 21, 377 P.2d 899, 27 Cal.
Rptr. 689 (1963), and Trans World Airlines v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 1 Misc. 2d 477, 148 N.Y.S.2d
284 (Sup. Ct. 1955).
133. 99 Idaho 326, 581 P.2d 784 (1978).
134. Id. at 331, 581 P.2d at 789.
135. Id. at 329, 581 P.2d at 787.
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however, the trial court found that plaintiff's damages were "caused by
design defect in the value train of the engine and negligent manufacture or
assembly in the torque amplifier. 1' 3 6 Accordingly, the trial court granted
judgment for the plaintiff on the negligence count for more than $26,000
7
in damages.'
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Idaho reversed the trial court's judgment
on both counts and remanded the case for trial on the warranty claim.3 8
With respect to the negligence count, the court noted that plaintiff had not
alleged any personal injury or property damage and held that the purchaser
of a defective product who had suffered only economic losses could not
recover those losses in a negligence action against the manufacturer.'
The
court observed that
[tihe law of negligence requires the defendant to exercise due care to
build a tractor that does not harm person or property. If the defendant
fails to exercise such due care it is of course liable for the resulting injury
to person or property as well as other losses which naturally follow from
that injury. However, the law of negligence does not impose on International Harvester a duty to build a tractor that plows fast enough and
breaks down infrequently enough for Clark to make a profit in his
custom farming business.'1o
In sum, the court held that such losses could be recovered, if at all, only
in an action for breach of warranty.
Moorman Manufacturing Co. v. National Tank Company'4 ' provides another recent example of a state supreme court adopting a rule against recovery
of purely economic loss in negligence in products cases. In Moorman, the
plaintiff purchased a grain storage tank from the defendant. Approximately
42
ten years after the plaintiff began using the tank it developed a crack.'
Sometime thereafter the plaintiff brought suit seeking to recover the costs
of repairing the tank as well as damages for loss of its use. The plaiitiff
alleged four theories of recovery: strict tort liability, negligent design, innocent misrepresentation and breach of warranty. 43 Like the court in Clark,
the Illinois Supreme Court in Moorman held that in the absence of personal
injury or property damage, economic losses such as those suffered by Moorman could be recovered only under article 2 of the U.C.C. on a theory of
breach of warranty.'"4

136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.

Id. at
Id.
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
91 Il.
Id. at
Id.
Id. at

331, 581 P.2d at 789.
348, 581 P.2d at 806.
332-36, 348, 581 P.2d at 790-94, 806.
336, 581 P.2d 794.
2d 69, 435 N.E.2d 443 (1982).
73, 435 N.E.2d at 445.
78-81, 88-92, 435 N.E.2d at 447-48, 452-53.
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As these cases suggest, most courts, in denying tort recovery for economic
loss in products cases, have not focused much attention on the distinction
between the tort theories of strict liability and negligence. Instead, courts
typically discuss recovery of economic loss in strict liability, and then, without
any examination of whether the reasons for denying recovery in strict liability
apply also to negligence, simply conclude that there can be no recovery in
tort. 4 There are important differences, however, between the tort theories
of strict liability and negligence-differences which require separate analyses
of the recoverability of economic loss under each theory.
A.

Strict Tort Liability & Economic Loss

In rejecting extension of strict tort liability to economic loss in Seely,
Justice Traynor noted that strict liability theory had developed specifically
as a response to the difficulties involved in applying warranty theory to
physical injuries caused by defective products. 146 He suggested, however, that
just as strict liability is better suited to the field of physical injuries, warranty
theory is better suited to the field of economic losses. 147 He pointed out that
extension of strict liability to economic losses would subject manufacturers
and sellers to liability for a product's failure to perform as the buyer wished
even when the manufacturer or seller had not agreed or promised that the
product would so perform.'" Moreover, this liability could not be disclaimed. 49 In addition, if a manufacturer of a mass produced defective
product were liable for economic loss suffered by one ultimate purchaser,
he could be similarly liable for losses suffered by many other purchasers,
thus raising the specter of liability for "damages of unknown and unlimited
scope." 5

0

145. See, e.g., Copiers Typewriters Calculators, Inc. v. Toshiba Corp., 576 F. Supp. 312
(D. Md. 1983); Arrow Leasing Corp. v. Cummins Ariz Diesel, 136 Ariz. 444, 666 P.2d 544
(1983); Alfred N. Koplin & Co. v. Chrysler Corp., 49 Ill. App. 3d 194, 364 N.E.2d 100 (1977);
Superwood Corp. v. Siempelkamp Corp., 311 N.W.2d 159 (Minn. 1981); see also cases cited
supra notes 6, 7.
146. Seely v. White Motor Co., 63 Cal. 2d 9, 403 P.2d 145, 149, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17 (1965).
147. Id. at 16-17, 403 P.2d at 150-51, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 22-23.
148. Id. at 16, 403 P.2d at 151, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 23.
149. Id. Courts have been generally unreceptive to disclaimers of strict tort liability. See
infra note 176.
150. Seely, 63 Cal. 2d at 16-17, 403 P.2d at 150-51, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 22-23. The court stated:
[i]f under these circumstances defendant is strictly liable in tort for the commercial
loss suffered by plaintiff, then it would be liable for business losses of other
truckers caused by the failure of its trucks to meet the specific needs of their
businesses, even though those needs were communicated only to the dealer.
In his dissent, Justice Peters took strong issue with this statement, stating:
[h]ere the majority seem to equate strict liability and the implied warranty of
fitness for a particular purpose ....
No authority is cited for this proposition,
and I have found none. So far as I know, no proponent of the concept of
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Justice Traynor ultimately concluded that, "[tihe distinction ... between
5
tort recovery for physical injuries and warranty recovery for economic loss"' '
rests on an understanding of what responsibilities are appropriately imposed

upon a manufacturer who distributes his products. According to Justice
Traynor, and the overwhelming majority of courts which have followed
Seely, it is appropriate to impose upon a manufacturer responsibility to
produce products which are reasonably safe; but it is not appropriate to
impose responsibility for the level of performance of a product in a purchaser's business absent agreement by the manufacturer. 5 2 As subsequent
decisions have noted, this distinction reflects the essential difference between

toi-t and contract'- 3-that is, the difference between obligations that may
appropriately be imposed by law and obligations that may appropriately
be
54
imposed only by consent of the party upon whom they are imposed.

The notion, that risks relating to parties' economic expectations should
be allocated by private agreement rather than imposed as a matter of law,
is inherent in two arguments often raised against extending strict liability to
economic loss. The first of these arguments is that to permit a purchaser
to recover economic damage in strict liability would undermine the bargain
manufacturers' strict liability has ever seriously argued that the manufacturer
should be liable for the product's inability to serve specific needs which the buyer
communicates only to the retailer, except insofar as those needs conform to what
the product is ordinarily expected (by the manufacturer and the consuming public)
to do.
Id. at 156 (Peters, J., dissenting).
151. Id. at 16, 403 P.2d at 151, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 23.
152. Id.
153. In Star Furniture Co. v. Pulaski Furniture Co., 297 S.E.2d 854 (W. Va. 1982), the
Supreme Court of West Virginia explained:
The difficulty in determining whether to apply strict liability for any type of
economic loss results from the tension between the tort doctrine of strict liability
and contract theory embodied in the Uniform Commercial Code.
This delineation between damage resulting from physical injury and that resulting from purchase of unsatisfactory products is in line with the general boundaries of tort and contract theory. Tort law traditionally has been concerned with
compensating for physical injury to person or property. Contract law has been
concerned with the promises parties place upon themselves by mutual obligation.
Physical harm to the defective products belongs with tort principles; reduction in
value merely because of the product flaw falls into contract law.
Id. at 858-59; see also Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 626 F.2d
280, 284-85 (3d Cir. 1980) (applying Illinois law); Northern Power & Engineering Corp. v.
Caterpillar Tractor Co., 623 P.2d 324, 328 (Alaska 1981); Just's Inc. v. Arrington Constr.
Co., 99 Idaho 462, 468, 583 P.2d 997, 1003 (1978); Moorman Mfg. Co., 91 Ill.
2d 69, 86-87,
435 N.E.2d 443, 450-51 (1982); Alfred N. Koplin & Co., 49 III. App. 3d 194, 198, 364 N.E.2d
100, 103 (1977).
154. See supra notes 1, 153. This concept is perhaps reflected in the Uniform Commercial
Code itself. U.C.C. § 2-719(3) (1978) states that it is prima facie unconscionable to exclude
liability for consequential damages consisting of personal injury but that it is not prima facie
unconscionable to exclude liability for consequential damages where the loss is commercial.
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of the parties.

55

Commercial losses are, of course, recoverable under a theory

of breach of warranty where there is an applicable warranty. 5 6 If the buyer
did not obtain warranty protection in the contract, however, allowing him
to recover in tort gives the buyer rights which he gave up in the contract.
In essence the argument is that to permit recovery of economic loss in strict
liability when the contract could not allow for recovery of the same loss in
warranty lets the buyer have his cake and eat it too.
The second argument is that to extend strict tort liability to economic loss
is inconsistent with the scheme of article 2 of the U.C.C. 57 Article 2 gives
155. See, e.g., Moorman Mfg. Co., 91 111. 2d at 78, 435 N.E.2d at 447; Fireman's Fund
Am. Ins. Cos. v. Burns Elec. Sec. Serv., 93 Il1.App. 3d 298, 300-01, 417 N.E.2d 131, 133-34
(1981); Alfred N. Koplin & Co., 49 II. App. 3d at 203-04, 364 N.E.2d at 107; Superwood
Corp., 311 N.W.2d 159, 161-62 (Minn. 1981); Mid Continent Aircraft Corp. v. Curry County
Spraying Serv., 572 S.W.2d 308, 312 (Tex. 1978).
156. U.C.C. §§ 2-714, 2-715 (1978). The former deals with the measure of damages for
breach of warranty, §§ 2-714(2), (3), and the latter deals with recovering incidental and consequential damages. See J. Wim & R. Sum ptas,
supra note 12, at 375-97.
157. In Morrow v. New Moon Homes, Inc., 548 P.2d 279 (Alaska 1976), the Alaska Supreme
Court observed:
Under the Uniform Commercial Code the manufacturer is given the right to avail
himself of certain affirmative defenses which can minimize his liability for a purely
economic loss. Specifically, the manufacturer has the opportunity. . . to disclaim
liability and ...

limit the consumer's remedies ....

In addition, the manufacturer

is entitled to reasonably prompt notice from the consumer to the claimed breach
of warranties ....
In our view, recognition of the doctrine of strict liability in tort for economic
loss would seriously jeopardize the continued viability of these rights. The economically injured consumer would have a theory of redress not envisioned by our
legislature when it enacted the U.C.C., since this strict liability remedy would be
completely unrestrained by disclaimer, liability limitation and notice provisions.
Further, manufacturers could no longer look to the Uniform Commercial Code
provisions to provide a predictable definition of potential liability for direct
ecomonic loss.
Id. at 285-86; see also Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 626 F.2d at 289; Moorman Mfg. Co.,
91 111. 2d at 78, 435 N.E.2d at 447; National Crane Corp. v. Ohio Steel Tube Co., 213 Neb.
782, 787, 332 N.W.2d 39, 44 (1983); Star Furniture Co., 297 S.E.2d 854, 859-60. The court
in Clark, 99 Idaho at 335, 581 P.2d at 793, made a similar observation in a negligence action
for recovery of pure economic loss.
Various commentators have said much the same thing. Professor Franklin, for example, in
his article, When Worlds Collide:Liability Theories and Disclaimersin Defective-ProductCases,
supra note 132, at 989-90, vigorously criticized the lack of judicial awareness of the scope of
sales law in defective-product cases:
It is striking that those who would use tort law to protect consumers in defectiveproduct cases do so with only the most cursory explicit recognition that there
may already be a body of law directed toward regulating the rights of buyers and
sellers, and a statutory body at that. The courts are operating at the border of
an area considered by draftsmen at great length and framed in legislatiodi arguably
relevent to the cases before the courts. Yet, these judges appear either unaware
of the merging of the tort and sales lines or else unwilling to consider the possible
limitations legislation may impose on traditional judicial primacy in tort law.
At best, we have judicial lack of awareness of the possible relevance of
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detailed treatment to the subject of sellers' liability for economic loss stemming from a product's failure to work properly. Several sections deal with
the creation of express and implied warranties. 58 Article 2, however, explicitly
permits a seller to disclaim warranties. 159 Even where a seller does give a
warranty, article 2 permits the seller to exclude liability for consequential
6
damagesl16 (other than personal injury) or limit the available remedies.' '
The argument is that a rule which would automatically permit recovery of
economic losses under a theory of strict tort liability would frustrate this
carefully drafted scheme of article 2 which clearly envisions the possibility
that a seller would not be liable for such losses where warranties are not
given or where liability for consequential damages is excluded. Implicit in
this argument is the notion that because article 2 is statutory, courts are not
free to disregard or frustrate it by judicial adoption of other rules inconsistent
with it.
In sum, three separate, but related, arguments against extending strict tort
liability to economic loss can be identified. First is the notion that contract
law rather than tort law should govern the economic expectations of the
parties-that is, the risks that those expectations will not be met should be
allocated by voluntary agreement rather than imposed upon one party as a
matter of law. This is what courts are suggesting when they object that to
permit recovery of economic losses in tort would "make the seller a guarantor
of his products,"' 162 or that recovery in tort would "undermine the bargain
of the parties,' 1 63 or that "contract, rather than tort, law provides the
appropriate set of rules for recovery."' 6" The second objection is the argument
that tort recovery would be inconsistent with article 2 of the U.C.C. Here
the notion is that, in adopting article 2, the legislature has provided an

sales law. At worst, we have open judicial defiance of apparent statutory
commands.
The Delaware Supreme Court has taken the extreme position that the adoption of the Uniform
Commercial Code, Article 2 on Sales has entirely preempted any tort remedy in products cases
even where there is physical damage or personal injury. Cline v. Prowler Indus., 418 A.2d 968
(Del. 1980). This case is mentioned and discussed in Wade, Tort Liabilityfor ProductsCausing
Physical Injury and Article 2 of the U.C.C., 48 Mo. L. REv. 1, 3 (1983).
158. U.C.C. §§ 2-313, 2-314, 2-315 (1978).
159. Id. § 2-316.
160. Id. § 2-719.
161. Id. § 2-719(l).
162. See e.g., Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 626 F.2d at 289 ("[tJhe extension of strict
liability to cover economic losses in effect would make a manufacturer the guarantor that all
of its products would continue to perform satisfactorily throughout their reasonably productive
life"); Moorman Mfg. Co., 91 111. 2d at 91, 435 N.E.2d at 453.
163. See supra note 155.
164. E.g., Moorman Mfg. Co., 91 Ill. 2d at 86-87, 435 N.E.2d at 451 ("[w]hen the defect
is of a qualitative nature and the harm relates to the consumer's expectation that a product is
of particular quality so that it is fit for ordinary use, contract, rather than tort, law provides
the appropriate set of rules for recovery"); see also Pennsylvania Glass Sand Corp. v. Caterpillar
Tractor Co., 652 F.2d 1165, 1169, 1172-73 (3d Cir. 1981).
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extensive scheme to govern the obligations of the parties to a sales transaction, including the remedies available in the event of product failure, and
that courts should not interfere with that scheme by recognizing conflicting
remedies in tort. The third notion is that tort recovery for economic loss
caused by defective products would subject manufacturers and sellers to
unforeseeable and potentially unlimited liability. This article will not attempt
to examine the merits of the arguments against extending strict liability to
economic loss. 65 Instead, it will argue that, even assuming the validity of
these arguments with respect to strict liability, they do not justify a blanket
refusal to recognize a cause of action in negligence for economic loss in
products cases.
B.

Economic Loss and Negligence in Product Cases

Only a few cases discuss separately the questions of whether a cause of
action for economic loss in products cases should be permitted in strict tort
liability and whether such a cause of action should be permitted in negligence.
Moreover, the cases that do treat these questions separately generally conclude quickly that the same concerns which lead them to reject strict liability
for economic loss also apply to negligence. In Clark v. InternationalHarvester Co.,'6 for example, the court dealt specifically with plaintiff's contention that the strict liability precedents were inapplicable to his negligence
claim, but rejected the distinction on the basis that permitting a negligence
action would be just as inconsistent with the scheme of article 2 as permitting
an action in strict liability. 67 Similarly, in Moorman Manufacturing Co.,'6
the court noted that "[tihe policy considerations against allowing recovery
for solely economic loss in strict liability cases apply to negligence actions
as well.' 69 Like the court in Clark, the Moorman court asserted that allowing
negligence actions for solely economic losses would be an unwarranted infringement upon the scheme of article 2.170 In addition, the Moorman court
suggested that imposition of liability for negligence, like imposition of strict
liability, would subject manufacturers to liability of unknown and unlimited
scope. 171
To the extent courts have considered the issue at all, the arguments raised
against permitting a cause of action in negligence have been essentially the
same as those raised against extending strict tort liability to economic loss:

165. The vast majority of courts and commentators who have considered the question have

declined to apply strict tort liability to economic loss. See supra notes 6, 15.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.

99 Idaho 326, 581 P.2d 784.
Id. at 336, 581 P.2d at 794.
91 II1. 2d 69, 435 N.E.2d 443.
Id. at 86-87, 435 N.E.2d at 451.
Id. at 90-91, 435 N.E.2d at 452-53.
Id. at 86-87, 435 N.E.2d at 451-52.
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that it would undermine the bargain of the parties,' 72 frustrate the scheme
of article 2, 73 and create the potential for indefinite liability. 174 In the context
of negligence, however, at least in certain cases, these arguments are much
less persuasive than they are in the context of strict liability.1 -1This is due
in large measure to two important differences between strict tort liability
and negligence. First, strict tort liability generally cannot be disclaimed 176
whereas negligence liability can be disclaimed in most situations. 77 Second,

172. See supra note 155 and accompanying text.
173. See supra note 157 and accompanying text.
174. See, e.g., Arrington, 99 Idaho at 470, 583 P.2d at 1005; Stevenson v. East Ohio Gas
Co., 73 N.E.2d 200, 201, 203-04 (Ohio Ct. App. 1946).
175. Nevertheless, the results in Clark and Moorman Mfg. may be correct. See infra note
211 and accompanying text.
176. Comment m to the RESTATmENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 402A (1981), the strict products
liability section, states that the liability imposed by § 402A cannot be disclaimed. See also
REsTATEmENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 195(3) (1981). Most courts follow comment m to § 402A,
but some have permitted disclaimers of strict tort liability at least in commercial settings where
the buyer and seller are large commercial entities who have negotiated their contract on relatively
equal footing. See, e.g., Tokio Marine & Fire Ins. Co. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 617 F.2d
936 (2d Cir. 1980) (applying California law); Idaho Power Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp.,
596 F.2d 924 (9th Cir. 1979) (applying Idaho law); Keystone Aeronautics Corp. v. R.J. Enstrom
Corp., 499 F.2d 146 (3d Cir. 1974) (applying Pennsylvania law); Ebasco Servs., Inc. v. Pennsylvania Power & Light Co., 460 F. Supp. 163 (E.D. Pa. 1978) (applying Pennsylvania law);
Salt River Project. Agr. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 143 Ariz. 368, 694 P.2d 198 (1984); KLines, Inc. v. Roberts Motor Co., 273 Or. 242, 541 P.2d 1378 (1975). See generally Comment,
ContractualDisclaimers of Strict Tort Liability in Oregon, 18 WnmsArm L.J. 631 (1982).
Two California appellate courts and several federal courts applying California law have gone
further and held that the doctrine of strict liability.is simply inapplicable as between commercial
entities who have bargained regarding the risk of loss from product defects. Airlift Int'l, Inc.
v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 685 F.2d 267 (9th Cir. 1982); S.A. Empresa, Etc. (Varig Airlines)
v. Boeing Co., 641 F.2d 746 (9th Cir. 1981); Scandinavian Airlines Sys. v. United Aircraft
Corp., 601 F.2d 425 (9th Cir. 1979); International Knights of Wine, Inc. v. Ball Corp., 110
Cal. App. 3d 1001, 168 Cal. Rptr. 301 (1980); Kaiser Steel Corp. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp.,
55 Cal. App. 3d 737, 127 Cal. Rptr. 838 (1976); see also Purvis v. Consolidated Energy Prods.
Co., 674 F.2d 217 (4th Cir. 1982) (applying South Carolina law and following the approach
of the cases already cited). Cf. Henry Heide, Inc. v. WRH Prods. Co., 766 F.2d 105 (3d Cir.
1985) (applying New Jersey law); Spring Motors Distribs., Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 98 N.J.
555, 589 A.2d 660 (1985) (holding that the doctrine of strict liability is inapplicable as between
commercial entities with respect to economic loss, thus limiting Santor v. A. & M. Karagheusian,
Inc., 44 N.J. 52, 207 A.2d 305 (1964), to noncommercial settings).
177. PROSSER, supra note 1, at 482-84; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 195 (1981);
REsTATEmENT (SEcOND) OF TORTS § 496B comments a, b (1981). Comment b to the REsrATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 496B states:
Likewise they (the plaintiff and defendant) may agree that the defendant shall
not be liable for conduct which would otherwise be negligent.... Where such
an agreement is freely and fairly made, between parties who are in an equal
bargaining position, and there is no social interest with which they interfere, it will generally be upheld.
The courts have held with near-unanimity that negligence liability can be disclaimed except
when contrary to public policy, as when one of the parties is at such an obvious disadvantage in
bargaining power that the contract effectively puts him at the mercy of the other party. PROSSER,
supra note 1, at 482; see, e.g., Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Alaska Airlines, Inc., 351 F.2d 253
(9th Cir. 1965); Dessert Seed Co. v. Drew Farmers Supply, Inc., 248 Ark. 858, 454 S.W.2d
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strict tort liability, although not absolute liability, is liability without fault. 7
79
Negligence liability, on the other hand, is fault based.
1. Tort v. Contract
One of the principle arguments raised against permitting tort recovery of
economic loss in products cases has been that the allocation of risks relating
to the parties' expectations should be governed by the rules of contract rather
than tort law. To permit a cause of action in tort, it is often argued, would

307 (1970). Even in jurisdictions that have adopted the "general principle... that a party may
not contract against his own negligence," Housing Auth. v. Morris, 244 Ala. 557, 563, 14 So.
2d 527, 531 (1947), exceptions have been made for "agreements that are essentially private
covenants in which the public has no interest and the enforcement of which will in no way be
injurious to the public." Alabama Great S. Ry. v. Sumter Plywood, 359 So. 2d 1140 (Ala.
1978).
Where the courts have not been uniform, however, is in deciding what language would be
sufficient to constitute a valid disclaimer of negligence liability. Some courts require that the
disclaimer use the word "negligence." See, e.g., O'Connell v. Walt Disney, 12 N.Y.2d 301,
189 N.E.2d 693, 239 N.Y.S.2d 337 (1963). Other courts require that the party's intention to
contract away negligence liability be expressed in "clear and unequivocal terms." E.g., Smith
v. Seaboard Constr. Line R.R., 639 F.2d 1235, 1239 (5th Cir. 1981) (applying Georgia law);
Batson-Cook Co. v. Georgia Marble Setting Co., 112 Ga. App. 226, 229-30, 144 S.E.2d 547,
549-50 (1965). The Illinois courts require that it be "clear from the contract that the parties'
intent was to shift the risk of loss," and that this would be determined by applying "the
accepted rule of interpretation which requires that the agreement be given a fair and reasonable
interpretation based upon a consideration of all of its language and provisions." Rutter v.
Arlington Park Jockey Club, 510 F.2d 1065, 1067 (7th Cir. 1975) (citing Tatar v. Maxon
Constr. Co., 54 II1. 2d 64, 67, 294 N.E.2d 272, 273-74 (1973)). In Haugen v. Ford Motor Co.,
219 N.W.2d 462 (N.D. 1974), the supreme court of North Dakota held that a disclaimer of
negligence liability would be valid only if the particular alleged negligent conduct was "plainly
and precisely" covered by the disclaimer.
178. Newman v. Utility Trailer & Equip. Co., 278 Or. 395, 397-99, 564 P.2d 674, 675-76
(1977); Berkebile v. Brantiy Helicopter Corp., 462 Pa. 83, 337 A.2d 893, 902 (1975); see also
RESTATEmENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 402A(2)(a) comment a (1979). But see Powers, The Persistence of Fault in Products Liability, 61 TaX. L. REv. 777 (1983). Powers observes:
While negligence requires a conclusion that the defendant acted inappropriately,
strict liability purports to impose liability even if the defendant has behaved
appropriately under the circumstances. Although divergent liability theories may
use different standards of fault, they remain fault-oriented insofar as they judge
the propriety of the defendant's conduct. Strict liability purports to differ from
negligence not in the standard by which it judges fault, but by eschewing an
evaluation of the defendant's conduct altogether.
Nevertheless courts have never equated strict liability with absolute liability, in which
a defendant would be liable merely for causing injury. The distinction between
absolute liability and strict products liability is maintained by requiring a plaintiff
to prove that the offending product was defective. Proponents of strict products
liability have argued that the requirement of defectiveness does not transform it
into a fault-based system as long as courts focus their evaluation on the condition
of the product rather than on the propriety of the defendant's conduct.
Id. at 778 n.3 (citations omitted).
179. See generally PROSSER, supra note 1, at 168-73, 608-09; RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF ToRTs
§ 282 comment f (1979).
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undermine the bargain of the parties.8 0 There is merit in this argument.
Extension of strict tort liability to economic loss caused by defective products
would impose the risks of economic loss due to product failure on the
manufacturer as a matter of law. To the extent that strict tort liability cannot
be disclaimed, any agreement of the parties attempting to absolve the manufacturer of these risks would be unenforceable."' Thus, imposition of strict
tort liability for economic loss is fundamentally inconsistent with a policy
committing allocation of the risks of such losses to the process of private
agreement.
Recognition of a cause of action in negligence to recover economic losses
caused by product failure, however, although a "tort" theory rather than
a "contract" theory, would not prevent allocation of these risks through
private agreement. It would not impose any risk on the manufacturer as a
matter of law. Because negligence liability, unlike strict tort liability, can be
disclaimed,.8 2 recognition of a cause of action in negligence would impose
risks upon the manufacturer only in the absence of a contrary agreement. 3
Whether recognition of a cause of action in negligence would undermine
the bargain of the parties thus becomes an issue of contract interpretation.
If a contract explicitly provided that the seller or manufacturer would not
be liable for economic loss caused by its own negligence, the matter would
be clear; imposition of liability would totally vitiate the parties' agreement.
A more common and more difficult question arises, however, where the
contract makes no reference to negligence but does contain a disclaimer of
warranty.1'4 In such cases a manufacturer or seller who has carefully bargained for the disclaimer might feel that to permit recovery of economic
loss on a tort theory would be to give the buyer the precise advantage he
had voluntarily given up in the contract.
Again it is important to distinguish between the tort theories of strict
liability and negligence. Warranty liability is liability without fault.'"5 In
agreeing to forego warranty protection, the buyer has at least given up the

180. See supra note 155 and accompanying text.
181. However, some courts have held that strict tort liability may be disclaimed as between
commercial entities and some other courts have held that strict liability is not even applicable
as between commercial entities. See supra note 176.
182. See supra note 177.
183. Not only would recognition of a cause of action in negligence impose risks upon the
manufacturer only in the absence of a contrary agreement, but also the liability that would be
involved would be only liability for negligence as opposed to the liability without fault that
would result from an extension of strict liability to cover economic loss.
184. Similar issues may arise ifthe contract includes other liability-limiting clauses such as
an exclusion of consequential damages, limitation of remedy or a liquidated damages clause.
See infra notes 216-20 and accompanying text.
185. B. CLARK & C. SmrrH, THE LAW OF PRODUCT WARRANTEES § 12.03(1), (11), at 12-5-8,
12-27-31 (1984); PROSSER, supra note 1, at 678, 690; J. WHrT & R. SUMMERs, supra note
12, at 271, 286.

1986]

NEGLIGENCE AND THE U.C. C

opportunity to hold the seller liable irrespective of fault for economic loss
resulting from product defects. Because strict tort liability also involves
liability without fault it would, if it were extended to economic loss, be a
close substitute for warranty protection, and would thus, in effect, nullify
86
the parties' agreement excluding warranty.

Allowance of a cause of action in negligence, however, would not necessarily thwart a contractual disclaimer of warranty. Indeed, a disclaimer of
warranty would still be important to permit the manufacturer or seller to
avoid liability without fault. A manufacturer or seller who gives a warranty
can be held liable merely upon a showing that the product does not conform
to the warranty.' 7 Before a manufacturer or seller could be held liable in
negligence, however, the buyer would have to show not only that the product
was defective but also that the defect was caused by the manufacturer's or
seller's negligence.'
Thus a disclaimer of warranty is not inherently inconsistent with the
existence of negligence liability. Nevertheless, a disclaimer might still be
intended, or understood, by the parties as eliminating all liability for economic loss including liability for negligence. Whether a disclaimer should
be so interpreted depends on the reasonable expectations of the parties. 8 9

186. Extension of strict liability to economic loss could present problems even in a jurisdiction
which would permit strict tort liability to be disclaimed. See supra note 176. If the parties have
contracted with respect to the extent of the seller's liability in warranty, that would seem to
preempt the field of liability without fault for economic loss resulting from product failure.
Accordingly, recognition of a cause of action in strict liability beyond the scope of warranty
protection in any particular contract would appear to undermine the bargain of the parties. In
other words, an agreement to exclude warranty liability is basically inconsistent with strict tort
liability for economic loss.
187. See B. CARcx & C. SmrrH, supra note 185, § 12.03(1), at 12-5-8; B. STONE, THE UNIFoRM
CoaMIactL CODE IN A NtrrsHEu 60-65 (1975); J. Wm'r & R. SUMsMES, supra note 12, at
360-65.
188. See PROSSER, supra note 1, at 164-65 (describing the elements of a negligence cause of
action).
189. The RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF CONTRACTS § 201 (1981), entitled Whose Meaning
Prevails, provides:
(1) Where the parties have attached the same meaning to a promise or agreement
or a term thereof, it is interpreted in accordance with that meaning.
(2) Where the parties have attached different meanings to a promise or agreement
or a term thereof, it is interpreted in accordance with the meaning attached
by one of them if at the time the agreement was made
(a) that party did not know of any different meaning attached by the
other, and the other knew the meaning attached by the first party;
or
(b) that party had no reason to know of any different meaning attached
by the other, and the other had reason to know the meaning attached
by the first party.
(3) Except as stated in this Section neither party is bound by the meaning attached
by the other, even though the result may be failure of mutual assent.
See also J. CuALARI & J. Pmuno, Tin LAw OF CONTRACTS 116-23 (2d ed. 1977); 3 A.
CoaRiN, CoRnmN ON CoNTmAcTs § 538 (1960).
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Where the seller bargains for a disclaimer of warranty, should the buyer
understand that the seller seeks to avoid not only the absolute liability of
warranty but also any liability for economic loss due to the seller's own
negligence?
In considering this question, it is useful to compare sales transactions with
service transactions. In sales cases, courts have generally refused to permit
recovery of economic loss in negligence and have limited the buyer to an
action for breach of warranty.' 90 In service transactions, however, the reverse
is often the case. That is, courts may deny recovery for breach of warranty
but permit an action in negligence, even to recover purely economic losses. 91
Courts have frequently suggested that the entire concept of warranty is
foreign to at least some kinds of service contracts. 92 Certainly warranty
liability would be inconsistent with the reasonable expectations of the parties

in some instances. In many service transactions the obtaining of a successful
outcome is inherently uncertain because the ultimate result sought by the
party purchasing the services depends on factors in addition to the proper
performance of the service in question. A patient may die even though the
physician properly performs an operation, or a client may be convicted even
though the attorney properly and skillfully defended the case. In such cases
it is highly unlikely that the party performing the service intends to, or
would even be willing to, "guarantee" the outcome, and consequently it is

unreasonable for the party purchasing the service to think that he is receiving
a warranty of result. 93 Consequently, in the absence of an explicit agreement
to the contrary, courts are very reluctant to find a warranty of result in
many service transactions.

190. See supra notes 7, 32.
191. See infra note 196.
192. See, e.g., Audlane Lumber & Builders Supply v. D.E. Britt Assocs., 168 So. 2d 333,
335 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1964) ("An engineer, or any other so-called professional, does not
'warrant' his service or the tangible evidence of his skill to be 'merchantable' or 'fit for an
intended use.' These are terms uniquely applicable to goods."); Corceller v. Brooks, 347 So.
2d 274, 277 (La. Ct. App. 1977) ("[w]arranty or guarantee by an attorney of a particular result
of a litigious claim is foreign to the nature of the legal profession"); Aegis Prod., Inc. v.
Arriflex Corp. of Am., 25 A.D.2d 639, 639, 238 N.Y.S.2d 185, 187 (1966) ("Warranties are
limited to sales of goods. No warranty attaches to the performance of a service.").
Warranties may be applicable, however, in mixed transactions involving goods as well as
services. See B. CLARK & C. SmIrrH, supra note 185, § 2.04(2)(b)(iii), at 2-26-29.
193. In Corceller v. Brooks, 347 So. 2d 274, 277-78 (La. Ct. App. 1977), the court stated:
This is not to say that we cannot conceive that an attorney may guarantee that
he will follow a particular course of action or do a specific thing on the client's
behalf. However, because the dispute between Corceller and Bonanza involved
litigious rights, the attorney for Corceller could not have warranted or guaranteed
a result favorable to [the] plaintiff.
The inherent uncertainty of result is not the only factor which might tend to suggest no warranty
of result was intended. In addition, where the fee charged for services is unrelated to the
importance of the result sought to be achieved and thus also unrelated to the extent of potential
liability if a warranty were given, this also supports an inference of no warranty.
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On the other hand, numerous cases impose liability in negligence holding
that one performing services must do so in a "workmanlike manner" or
that he must exercise the degree of care and skill that would be exercised
by one who was "reasonably prudent, skilled and qualified" to perform the
service.194 Although warranty liability may be contrary to the reasonable
expectations of the parties, negligence liability is often consistent with the
parties' reasonable expectations. While it would be generally unreasonable
for a patient to assume that a surgeon intended to guarantee that an operation
would be a success, it seems perfectly reasonable for a patient to assume
that the surgeon was undertaking to properly perform the surgery. The
outcome of surgery is not entirely within the control of the surgeon, but it
is within the surgeon's control to avoid carelessness in performing surgery,
and it is reasonable to expect that the surgeon in agreeing to perform surgery
undertakes to do what he can to contribute to a successful result. 95 Whenever
one party agrees to perform services for another, a natural inference arises
that in agreeing to perform the service one undertakes to perform it in a
prudent and careful manner.
Liability for negligent failure to perform services in a "workmanlike
manner" has not been confined to cases involving physical damage. To the
contrary, courts have imposed such liability in a variety of contexts involving

194.
Those who hire experts for the predominant purpose of rendering services, relying
on their special skills, cannot expect infallibility. Reasonable expectations, not
perfect results in the face of any and all contingencies, will be ensured under a
traditional negligence standard of conduct. In other words, unless the par-ties have
contractually bound themselves to a higher standard of performance, reasonable
care and competence owed generally by practitioners in the particular trade or
profession defines the limits of an injured party's justifiable demands.
Milau Assocs. v. North Ave. Dev. Corp., 42 N.Y.2d 482, 486, 398 N.Y.S.2d 882, 884, 368
N.E.2d 1247, 1250 (1977); see also Consolidated Edison Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 567
F. Supp. 358 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (holding that while the plaintiff utility company's claims of
defective equipment and improper operating instructions did not state a cause of action in
negligence, the plaintiff did have a negligence action under New York Law for negligent
performance of contractual duties and for alleged concealment by defendant of data showing
that problems had developed with the steam generator for the nuclear power plant); Gagne v.
Bertran, 42 Cal. 2d 481, 489, 275 P.2d 15, 21 (1954) ("The services of experts are sought
because of their special skill. They have a duty to exercise the ordinary skill and competence
of members of their profession, and a failure to discharge the duty will subject them to liability
for negligence."); Strong v. Retail Credit Co., 38 Colo. App. 125, 552 P.2d 1025 (1976)
(preparation of a defective credit report by credit bureau should be governed by negligence
principles and not the U.C.C.); D.E. Britts Assocs., 168 So.2d 333 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1964)
(a professional, such as an engineer or architect, owes a duty to exercise his skills reasonably
and without neglect, and breach of this duty subjects him to negligence liability); Jones v.
Clark, 36 N.C. App. 327, 244 S.E.2d 183 (1978) (testing laboratory that gave mobile home a
seal of approval subject to negligence standard to measure the quality of its inspection services);
PAOSSER, supra note 1, at 185-86, 658-64.
195. See generally PROSSER, supra note 1, at 186-93. Professionals such as physicians are
held to a "higher" standard of care in that they are required to perform in accordance with
accepted medical practice. Id. at 187.
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only economic loss.196 The most common examples involve negligence on

the part of accountants,197 architects,198 attorneys,199 engineers20° and other

professionals. 20 1 In addition, the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 552 imposes
similar liability for economic loss resulting from negligent provision of erroneous information upon anyone who in the course of his business provides
information for the guidance of others in their business affairs. 202 Courts
have occasionally imposed liability for economic loss due to negligent performances of contractual duties in other circumstances as well. 203 The point
is that courts have long recognized, in the context of service transactions,

that liability in negligence for economic loss is not necessarily
inconsistent
4
with the absence of warranty liability for the same loss.2

196. "Moreover, a suit for negligent performance of contractual duties is clearly available
even where only economic injury is alleged." Consolidated Edison Co., 567 F. Supp. 358, 364
(S.D.N.Y. 1983); see infra notes 197-203.
197. See supra note 40.
198. See supra note 42.
199. See supra note 41.
200. See supra note 43.
201. See supra note 44.
202. See supra note 45. Quite a number of courts have allowed even third parties not in
privity with the person who negligently supplied information to recover for economic losses in
negligence. See cases cited supra note 48.
203. For example, in DCR, Inc. v. Peak Alarm Co., 663 P.2d 433 (Utah 1983), the plaintiff,
a clothing store owner, contracted with defendant alarm company for the purchase, installation
and maintenance of a burglar alarm system in plaintiff's store. The contract contained a clause
limiting damages to $50.00 in the event of breach. Some time later the store was burglarized
and $50,000.00 was taken. Plaintiff then discovered that the burglars had bypassed the alarm
using a simple deactivating technique well-known to criminals, and that the defendant knew
of the technique and of the inexpensive way to protect against it. The plaintiff sued on negligence,
breach of contract, and product liability theories. The Utah Supreme Court characterized the
transaction as a service transaction, and held that: (1) the negligence action existed independently
of the contract claims, the alleged negligent conduct being a breach of the duty to warn; (2)
since the alleged negligent conduct was an omission or nonfeasance, a special relationship must
exist between the parties, and here it did by virtue of the service contract between plaintiff
and defendant; and (3) the liquidated damages clause did not operate to limit noncontractual
liability as it did not clearly and unequivocally express intent to do so. Id. at 434-38. Another
case, Bunch v. South Central Bell Tel. Co., 356 So. 2d 104 (La. Ct. App. 1978), involved a
negligence action against a telephone company to recover lost profits and increased expenses
allegedly resulting from defendant's negligence in incorrectly listing the telephone number of
plaintiff's business competitor as the telephone number of plaintiff's business. There the court
approved of the negligence action without discussion of the economic loss issue and held that
the contractual disclaimer of liability between the parties (limiting damages to an abatement
of charges) did not operate to disclaim negligence liability. See also ConsolidatedEdison Co.,
567 F. Supp. 358, 363-66 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (plaintiff utility company's claims concerning alleged
concealment by defendant of data showing problems with steam generators in nuclear power
plant that defendant agreed to furnish and construct stated a cause of action in negligence, as
did their separate claim for negligent performance of contractual services). However, contractual
limitations on liability may apply to the tort action. See infra note 220.
204. There has been some recognition of this in products cases as well. "Limiting contractual
language and limitless liability predicated upon negligence can coexist in situations such as this
one, and this duality can only be foresworn by language which will bear no interpretation other
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Of course a simple sales contract is very different from a contract for
services. When a retail merchant sells an item over the counter to a purchaser
the item is either defective or it is not. If the seller is to be liable in the
event that the item is defective, his liability almost has to be liability without
fault because there is virtually no conduct on the seller's part which could
have anything to do with the item's being defective. Consequently, a disclaimer of warranty would seem to eliminate any reasonable expectation on
the part of the buyer that the seller will be liable if the item is defective.
Just as the concept of warranty is foreign to some service contracts, so the
concept of negligence is foreign to a simple sales contract.
Many sales contracts, however, involve more than the simple over the
counter retail sales. Specifically, many "sales" transactions involve services
as well as goods. A beautician may not only sell but may also apply a beauty
treatment. 205 Similarly a contractor may install as well as sell a swimming
pool.20 Courts commonly treat such "mixed transactions" as sales. 207 The

than that the seller shall not be held responsible for his own negligent wrongdoing." Jig the
Third Corp. v. Puritan Marine Ins. Underwriters Corp., 519 F.2d 171, 178-79 (5th Cir. 1975),
cert. denied, 424 U.S. 954 (1976) (quoted in Miller Indus. v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 733 F.2d
813, 817-18 (l1th Cir. 1984)).
205. E.g., Newmark v. Gimbels, Inc., 54 N.J. 585, 258 A.2d 697 (1969). But see Epstein v.
Giannattasio, 25 Conn. Supp. 109, 197 A.2d 342 (1963).
206. See, e.g., Riffe v. Black, 548 S.W.2d 175 (Ky. 1977); Hannon v. Original Gunite
Aquatech Pools, Inc., 385 Mass. 813, 434 N.E.2d 611 (1982). But see Gulash v. Stylarama,
Inc., 33 Conn. Supp. 108, 364 A.2d 1221 (1975).
207. The courts have generally employed a "predominant element" or "essence of the
transaction" test to determine whether the transaction is to be treated as a sale under the
U.C.C. or as a service. If the predominant element or essence of the transaction is the sale of
the goods rather than the rendition of services, the rules of article 2 are applied to the transaction.
Bonebrake v. Cox, 499 F.2d 951 (8th Cir. 1974). The courts have not been uniform as to what
factors are considered in applying this test, and the lack of guidelines has subjected the test
to criticism from numerous commentators. This is a rather mechanical approach, but the courts
favor it. Sometimes they are swayed by the wording of the contract, as when the plaintiff is
denominated as 'owner' rather than'as 'buyer,' and the defendant as 'contractor' rather than
'seller.' See, e.g., Nitrin, Inc. v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 35 Ill. App. 3d 577, 342 N.E.2d 65
(1976). Sometimes the courts look at the price factor, attempting to analyze the billing, see,
e.g., Arvida Corp. v. A.J. Indus., Inc., 370 So. 2d 809 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979) and Aluminum
Co. of Am. v. Electro Flo Corp., 451 F.2d 1115 (10th Cir. 1971), and sometimes the decision
is based on nothing more than a judicial hunch as to which element predominates. See, e.g.,
Wells v. 10-X Mfg. Co., 609 F.2d 248 (6th Cir. 1979); Manes Org., Inc. v. Standard Dyeing
& Finishing Co., 472 F. Supp. 687 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); see also B. CLARK & C. SMrrn,supra
note 185, § 2.04(2Xa), at 2-19 to 2-20. For general commentary dealing with the goods-services
issue, see Farnsworth, Implied Warranties of Quality in Non-Sale Cases, 57 CoLuM. L. Rav.
653 (1957); Singal, Extending Implied Warranties Beyond Goods: Equal Protectionfor Consumers of Services, 12 NEw EN L. L. Ray. 859 (1977); Comment, Guidelines for Extending
Implied Warranties to Service Markets, 125 U. PA. L. Rav. 365 (1976). For other leading cases
applying the predominant element test, see Triangle Underwriters, Inc. v. Honeywell, Inc., 604
F.2d 37 (2d Cir. 1979); Gulash, 33 Conn. Supp. 108, 364 A.2d 1221 (1975); Meyers v. Henderson
Constr. Co., 147 N.J. Super. 77, 370 A.2d 547 (1977).
Under this all-or-nothing approach, courts frequently treat mixed transactions as sales and,
consequently, apply the U.C.C. rules to the entire transaction, including the service portion.
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phenomenon of "mixed transactions" being treated as sales is not limited,
however, to circumstances in which the services involve only routine applications or installations of products. Many transactions have been held to be
sales rather than services even when they involve sophisticated engineering
or design services. 28 A good example involves contracts to supply computer
systems with custom-designed or adapted software for the particular appli29
cations needed by the party acquiring the computer system. 0

See infra notes 208, 209. As B. CLARK & C. SMITH, supra note 185, have observed, in most
cases involving the purchase and installation of products that were identifiable goods before
installation and that when installed constituted only a small part of a total building, courts
have generally treated the transactions as sales under article 2. Some examples are the sale and
installation of carpets, electrical equipment, steel lockers, overhead doors, furnaces, swimming
pools, and air conditioning systems. Id. at § 2.04(2)0b), 2-26-27.
There is some authority in England for splitting mixed transactions where possible and
applying warranty law at least to the goods portion of the transaction even if the transaction
as a whole does not constitute a sale. This is discussed in Farnsworth, supra at 664.
208. This is perhaps most evident in transactions involving the sale of computer hardware
and software packages specially adapted to the buyer's business needs. See infra note 209. The
courts have also been quite willing to treat other mixed transactions involving sophisticated
design or engineering services as sales of goods under the U.C.C. See, e.g., Pittsburgh-Des
Moines Steel Co. v. Brookhaven Manor Water Co., 532 F.2d 572 (7th Cir. 1976) (undertaking
to design and construct a one million gallon water tank and to fabricate the structural steel
for it); Electro Flo Corp., 451 F.2d 1115 (10th Cir. 1971) (undertaking to design, manufacture
and deliver portable electrified flooring for amusement park rides); Standard Structural Steel
Co. v. Debron Corp., 515 F. Supp. 803 (D. Conn. 1980) (undertaking to "detail," fabricate
and deliver structural steel); see also Belmont Indus. v. Bechtel Corp., 425 F. Supp. 524, 528
(E.D. Pa. 1976), where the court said: "The fact that a specially designed product [i.e., the
structural steel] ... was required does not negate the characterization of the transaction as a
sale of goods." See generally B. CLARK & C. SmrmH, supra note 185, § 2.04(2)(a), at 2-19-22.
209. "The courts are, with virtual unanimity, sweeping both hardware and software transactions, into the scope of article 2 [of the U.C.C.]." B. CLARK & C. SMrrH, supra note 185,
§ 2.04(2)(b)(iv), at 2-31. The authors note further that even in cases involving the sale of
software alone, several courts have applied article 2 provisions without much analysis:
The courts appear to be moving in this direction in spite of the counter argument
that, by strict application of the predominant element test, the intangible intellectual product will far exceed in value the relatively inexpensive disc, tape, drum,
or other physical embodiment of the ideas.
Id.; see also cases cited id. at nn. 146, 148. The authors also note that when computer programs
are part of the contract for the computer itself, and are delivered some time after delivery of
the computer, the courts have held the programs to be incidental to the sale of the hardware,
thus bringing the transaction within the scope of article 2. Id. § 2.04, at 2-30 (citing as examples
Carl Beasley Ford, Inc. v. Burroughs Corp., 361 F. Supp. 325 (E.D. Pa. 1973), aff'd, 493
F.2d 1400 (3d Cir. 1974); Burroughs Corp. v. Joseph Uram Jewelers, Inc., 305 So. 2d 215
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1974)). See also Triangle Underwriters, Inc. v. Honeywell, Inc., 604 F.2d
737 (2d Cir. 1979); Chatlos Sys., Inc. v. National Cash Register Corp., 479 F. Supp. 738
(D.N.J. 1979), aff'd, 635 F.2d 1081 (1980), 670 F.2d 1304 (1982), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 2918
(1982); W.R. Weaver Co. v. Burroughs Corp., 580 S.W.2d 76 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979).
In Samuel Black Co. v. Burroughs Corp., 33 U.C.C. REP. SERv. (Callaghan) 954 (D. Mass.
1981), involving a hardware-software package deal, the court held that even if article 2 did
not literally apply to the software component of the transaction, the Code warranty provisions
should be invoked by analogy. The court gave full effect to the warranty disclaimers and
limitations of remedy clause on the face of the software agreement.
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The general rule in sales transactions that economic losses cannot be
recovered on a theory of negligent design or manufacture but only on a
theory of breach of warranty is probably consistent with the expectations
of the parties in the simple retail sale involving no significant services element.
Even in transactions involving a significant element of services, the general
rule seems consistent with the reasonable expectations of the parties where
the achievement of a successful outcome is not inherently problematic-that
is, where the involved services are such that, so long as the manufacturer/
seller exercises due care, a successful result is likely to follow. In such cases
the chief hazard to avoid is a failure to exercise due care, and the purchaser
would therefore have some reason to know that, if the contract disclaims
warranties, that the manufacturer/seller will probably expect to avoid liability
210
for negligence.
The general rule may also be consistent with the reasonable expectations
of the parties when they contract with respect to an existing product. Even
if complex engineering or design activities were required to produce the
product, those activities were not undertaken for the particular purchaser.
Moreover, any such "services" would have been completed prior to the
parties' entering into the contract and would have "merged" into the final
product. Furthermore, it is the final product upon which the parties are
likely to focus. In such circumstances it seems unlikely that the purchaser
would develop any expectations about the design and manufacturer of the
product apart from expectations as to whether the product will actually
work. Consequently, a bargained disclaimer of warranty would be likely to
suggest to a buyer that he was accepting the risk of product failure from
21
whatever cause. '
When a purchaser contracts to have a product specially designed and
manufactured, however, denial of a cause of action in negligence may be
inconsistent with the reasonable expectations of the parties. Contracts for
custom-designed products may involve complex design and engineering services, and the success of the product may depend on factors in addition to
the manufacturer/seller's exercise of due care. 2 2 In such circumstances, the
analogy to professional service contracts is very appealing and suggests the
applicability of negligence liability to the services portion of the transaction. 21 3

210. This would also seem to be true in pure service contracts where the most likely cause
of any problems would be carelessness by the party performing the services. This seems like a
plausible explanation in a number of service contract cases where courts have denied a cause
of action for negligence. See infra note 220.
211. The results in Clark, 99 Idaho 326, 581 P.2d 784, and Moorman Mfg., 91 111. 2d 69,
435 N.E.2d 443, may be correct on this basis. These cases are discussed supra text accompanying
notes 133-45.
212. See supra note 208.
213. Some courts have imposed negligence liability for services which were part of a mixed
transaction where the services involved were not rendered in connection with the production or
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Just as an attorney, physician or other professional is unlikely to give a
warranty of result, a manufacturer/seller may well be unwilling to guarantee
a product which might not work despite exercise of due care in its design

and manufacture. Nevertheless, when a manufacturer/seller undertakes to
perform sophisticated engineering and design services as part of a sales

transaction, the same natural inference arises as in a professional service
contract-that the services will be performed with due care. The inclusion

of a disclaimer of warranty would not necessarily negate that inference
because a disclaimer is necessary for the manufacturer/seller to avoid even
the absolute liability of the implied warranties of merchantability 2 4 and
fitness of purpose. 2 5 The manufacturer/seller's reluctance to guarantee a
product absolutely, like an attorney or physician's reluctance to give a
warranty of result, is perfectly consistent with an undertaking to exercise
due care. Thus, liability in negligence for failure to exercise due care may
be equally consistent with the parties' expectations in the "mixed transaction" involving sophisticated design and engineering services as in the professional service contract, and a disclaimer of warranty does not necessarily
indicate otherwise.
A disclaimer of warranty is not the only provision in a sales contract that
could be undermined by recognition of a cause of action in negligence.
Provisions for limited or exclusive remedies, 216 exclusions of consequential
damages 2 7 and clauses liquidating damages 21s raise similar problems. Only
a disclaimer of warranty, however, is potentially inconsistent with a cause
of action in negligence altogether. The issues raised by these other contractual

manufacture of the product. See, e.g., Consol. Edison Co., 567 F. Supp. 358 (S.D.N.Y 1983)
(court distinguished between services that were involved in the production of the product (i.e.,
part and parcel of the sale of the product), and services that are not separable from the
production of the product (installing the finished product, for example), and was willing to
impose negligence liability only with respect to the latter); Peak Alarm Co., 663 P.2d 433.
214. Section 2-314 of the Uniform Commercial Code imposes an implied warranty of merchantability in all sales transactions in which the seller is a merchant, subject to certain
exceptions. Section 2-316 of the Uniform Commercial Code provides that the implied warranty
of merchantability may be excluded or modified in the contract but only by language which
uses the word "merchantability." Furthermore, if the disclaimer is in writing, it must be
conspicuous.
215. Section 2-315 of the Uniform Commercial Code provides: "Where the seller at the time
of contracting has reason to know any particular purpose for which the goods are required
and that the buyer is relying on the seller's skill or judgment to select or furnish suitable goods,
there is unless excluded or modified under the next section an implied warranty that the goods
shall be fit for such purpose." Section 2-316 of the Uniform Commercial Code provides that
any implied warranty of fitness may be excluded only by a writing and that any such writing
must be conspicuous.
216. Section 2-719 of the Uniform Commercial Code permits the parties to modify or limit
the remedies available for breach.
217. Section 2-719 of the Uniform Commercial Code also permits the parties to limit or
exclude liability for consequential damages except where such limitation would be unconscionable.
218. Section 2-718 of the Uniform Commercial Code permits the parties to liquidate damages.
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provisions relate to whether they should apply only to contract claims or
whether they should apply also to any cause of action permitted in negligence.219 Whether the parties in any given case would be likely to expect or
understand that such clauses apply to a cause of action in negligence would
seem to depend on the same kinds of factors as their expectations regarding
the effect of a disclaimer of warranty. Where a sales transaction involves
complex design or engineering services and the successful outcome of the
project is inherently problematic, it is reasonable for the manufacturer/seller
to seek to avoid the risk of problems which may arise despite his best efforts.
That a manufacturer/seller has sought to avoid such risks, however, does
not necessarily suggest that he is also unwilling to bear responsibility for
failure to exercise due care. Consequently, under such circumstances, a
disclaimer of warranty may well be understood to exclude only liability
without fault and may not negate the natural inference that the involved
services will be performed in a careful manner. A limitation of remedy,
exclusion of consequential damages or a provision for liquidated damages,
which simply provides a more limited form of protection for the manufacturer/seller, may reasonably be understood in the same way for the same
reason.
On the other hand, in a transaction where the outcome depends for the
most part upon the manufacturer/seller's exercise of due care, a disclaimer
of warranty, and likewise a limitation of remedy, exclusion of consequential
damages or a provision for liquidated damages, would seem more likely to
be understood to apply to a cause of action in negligence. Where the failure
of the manufacturer/seller to exercise due care is the major problem to be
avoided, the purchaser would have reason to know that a limitation of
liability is intended to apply to such failure.220

219. A party might seek to bring an action in tort rather than in contract in hopes of
avoiding contractual provisions limiting remedies or excluding consequential damages. See, e.g.,
Orkin Exterminating Co. v. Walters, 466 N.E.2d 55 (Ind. Ct. App. 1984) (homeowners cannot
avoid limitation of liability clause in contract by bringing the action in tort rather than in

contract).
220. See, e.g., id. In Walters, the court permitted an action in tort but held that the limitation

of damages clause in the contract applied to the tort action.
Other cases have reached similar results by denying a cause of action in tort altogether, often
on the basis that the defendant was guilty only of nonfeasance as opposed to misfeasance. See,
e.g., Orkin Exterminating Co. v. Stevens, 130 Ga. App. 363, 203 S.E.2d 587 (1973). The
distinction between nonfeasance and misfeasance, however, is elusive and difficult to apply.
See generally PROSSER, supra note 1, at 373-85, 660-64. Prosser notes that this distinction is
not a clear one, and observes that "Et]here has been little consideration of the problem of just
where inaction ceases and 'misfeasance' begins." Id. at 661. A comparison of the Walters and
Stevens cases demonstrates this difficulty. In Walters the court characterized the defendant's
conduct as misfeasance, while the court in Stevens characterized similar conduct as nonfeasance.
Another case with facts similar to those in Stevens and Walters is Allred v. Dobbs, 137 Ga.
App. 227, 223 S.E.2d 265 (1976). The court in Allred characterized the defendant's conduct
as misfeasance and permitted a tort action. Although the court in Allred attempted to distinguish
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The argument that recognition of a cause of action for negligent design
or manufacture where the losses are purely economic would undermine or

be inconsistent with the bargain of the parties must be premised on an
assumption that the bargain of the parties z22 excludes such liability. To make
that assumption in the absence of an explicit statement in the contract
excluding such liability is inconsistent with the way courts have generally

dealt with disclaimers of negligence. Although negligence liability can be
disclaimed in many circumstances, courts have usually required that a disclaimer be very clear.m To deny a cause of action in negligence on the
grounds that it is inconsistent with the bargain of the parties may be appropriate in the context of a simple retail sale. In a mixed transaction
involving a significant element of sophisticated services, however, denial of

a cause of action in negligence may actually contravene rather than effectuate
the parties' expectations.

2. Negligence and the U.C.C.
The second principal argument against permitting tort recovery of economic losses in products cases is that recognition of a cause of action 2in
tort would be inconsistent with the scheme of article 2 of the U.C.C. 2

Stevens, it has been observed that, "[e]fforts to distinguish the two cases are artificial at best."
Synthetic Indus. v. Whitlock, Inc., 439 F. Supp. 1297, 1301 (N.D. Ga. 1977). Interestingly, in
Allred, there was no contractual limitation of liability.
It is submitted that the approach taken in Walters offers a more persuasive explanation for
the result. By permitting a tort action and framing the issue in terms of whether a contractual
clause limiting liability should apply to the tort action, the court focused attention on the
expectations of the parties rather than on the confusing distinction between nonfeasance and
misfeasance. Moreover, it seems that in the Stevens case as in the Walters case it would have
been appropriate to interpret the damage limitation clause as applying to a negligence action
as well as to a contract action. If an attempt to exterminate termites is not successful, carelessness
on the part of the exterminator seems not to be an unlikely explanation. Consequently, the
plaintiffs, when entering into the contracts, would have had reason to realize that the defendants,
in seeking limitations on liability, would expect them to apply even to damages due to their
carelessness. This is probably the explanation for the court's reluctance in both cases to permit
the plaintiff to circumvent the damage limitation clauses by bringing their actions in tort.
221. The Uniform Commercial Code in § 1-201(3) (1977) defines agreement as follows:
.'Agreement' means the bargain of the parties in fact as found in their language or by
implication from other circumstances including course of dealing or usage of trade or course
of performance ...
"
222. PROSSER, supra note 1, at 482-84. See, e.g., Miller Indus., 733 F.2d 813, 817-18 (11th
Cir. 1984); Jig the Third Corp., 519 F.2d 171, 178-79 (5th Cir. 1975); see supra note 177.
223. "The UCC provides the proper framework for a purchaser's recovery of economic
losses. Allowing an aggrieved party to recover under a negligence theory for solely economic
loss would constitute an unwarranted infringement upon the scheme provided by the UCC."
Moorman Mfg. Co., 91 Ill. 2d at 88, 435 N.E.2d at 452; see also Jones & Laughlin Steel
Corp., 626 F.2d at 289 (strict liability and negligence); Morrow v. New Moon Homes, Inc.,
548 P.2d 279, 285-86 (Alaska 1976) (strict liability and the UCC); Clark, 99 Idaho at 335, 581
P.2d at 793 (negligence); Ohio Steel Tube Co., 213 Neb. at 789-90, 332 N.W.2d at 44 (strict
liability and negligence); Star Furniture Co., 297 S.E.2d at 859-60 (strict liability); see supra
note 157 (commentary on the inconsistency between the UCC and tort recovery in economic
loss cases).
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Under article 2 a seller may become liable for economic losses resulting from
a product's failure to perform as desired by a buyer if the sales contract
provides for warranty liability. 224 If the seller gives a warranty that the

product will perform in a certain way, the seller will be liable for breach
of warranty simply upon a showing that the product failed to perform in
accordance with the warranty.? Warranty liability, in other words, is strict
liability. However, article 2 does not impose warranty liability upon the
seller as a matter of law. Rather, under article 2 warranty liability depends
on the agreement of the parties. Article 2, at least in theory, permits a seller
to avoid warranty liability altogether if the parties so agree.2 6 Thus article
2 commits to the process of private agreement the question of whether and
to what extent a seller will be liable solely for the reason that a product
does not perform to the level expected or desired by the buyer.
Extension of strict tort liability to economic loss would be inconsistent
with this scheme. Strict tort liability, like warranty liability, imposes liability
without fault. 227 Strict tort liability would, therefore, be a very close func-

"8
tional substitute for warranty liability if it were extended to economic loss.
Moreover, because strict tort liability cannot be disclaimed, 229 liability for
losses due to inadequate product performance would be imposed upon sellers

224. U.C.C. §§ 2-313, 2-314, 2-315 (1977).
225. See supra note 187 and accompanying text.
226. U.C.C. § 2-316 (1977). However, it may be very hard to eliminate all warranties in
practice. Section 2-313(1)(b), entitled Express Warranties by Affirmation, Promise,Description,
Sample, provides:
(1) Express warranties by the seller are created as follows:
(b) Any description of the goods which is made part of the basis of
the bargain creates an express warranty that the goods shall conform
to the description.
Moreover, comment 4 to § 2-313 provides in part:
Thus, a contract is normally a contract for a sale of something describable and
described. A clause generally disclaiming "all warranties, express or implied"
cannot reduce the seller's obligation with respect to such description and therefore
cannot be given literal effect under section 2-316.
Finally, § 2-316(1) provides:
§ 2-316. Exclusion or Modification of Warranties
(1) Words or conduct relevant to the creation of an express warranty and
words or conduct tending to negate or limit warranty shall be construed wherever
reasonable as consistent with each other; but ...negation or limitation is inoperative to the extent that such construction is unreasonable.
Id. (emphasis added).
Thus, although sellers and manufacturers can significantly limit their warranty liability, see
Special Project, Article Two Warrantiesin Commercial Transactions, 64 CORNELL L. REV. 30,
170 (1978), it may in fact be very difficult to get rid of all warranties.
227. See supra note 178.
228. "Except in these areas which the drafters have given rather explicit meaning to 402A
by their comments, and except for the fact that 402A would not normally apply to economic
losses, we believe that the two standards [i.e., strict liability and the implied warranty of
merchantability] are interchangeable." J. WE= & R. StmMERs, supra note 12, at 355-56.
229. See supra note 176.
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as a matter of law rather than pursuant to agreement. Extension of strict
tort liability to economic loss would thus undermine the scheme of article
2 which permits the parties, by agreement, to define the scope and extent
of warranty liability.
Although extension of strict liability to economic loss would be inconsistent
with article 2, recognition of a cause of action in negligence for such loss
would not disturb the scheme of article 2. First, recognition of such a cause
of action would not impose any liability upon sellers as a matter of law.
To the contrary, negligence liability, like warranty liability, could be disclaimed in the contract.? 0 Recognition of a cause of action in negligence
would not interfere with the basic policy of article 2 to permit the parties
by agreement to define the scope and extent of a seller's liability for the
level of performance of his products. Rather, recognition of a cause of
action in negligence would merely permit courts to hold the seller liable for
negligence when that was consistent with the agreement of the parties. In
addition, liability for negligence is not a functional substitute for warranty
protection. If a buyer obtains a warranty that a product will perform in a
particular manner, the seller becomes liable merely upon a showing that the
product failed to perform as warranted. In the absence of a warranty, a
buyer could not hold a seller liable without showing, in addition, that the
product's failure was caused by the seller's negligence. Thus, there is no
inherent inconsistency between the existence of a cause of action in negligence
for economic loss in sales cases and article 2, as there is between extension
of strict tort liability to economic loss and article 2.
Moreover, article 2 itself does not preclude recognition of a cause of action
for negligence for economic loss. Nothing in the warranty provisions of
article 2 suggests that the possibility of creating warranty liability is meant
to preempt the possibility of liability in negligence. 2 ' Indeed, comment 2 to
section 2-318 mentions that the extension of warranties given to the buyer
to certain other beneficiaries is not meant to be in derogation of any rights
resting on negligence. 2 2 Finally, section 1-103 provides that other supplementary principles of law remain applicable "unless displaced by the particular provisions of this Act . . . ." The fact that no provision in article 2
provides for a cause of action in negligence should not be deemed important,

230. See supra note 177.
231. See U.C.C. §§ 2-313, 2-316, 2-318 (1977).
232. Comment 2 to § 2-318 states in part: "The purpose of this section is to give certain
beneficiaries the benefit of the same warranty which the buyer received in the contract of sale,
thereby freeing any such beneficiairies from any technical rules as to 'privity.' It seeks to
accomplish this purpose without any derogation of any right or remedy resting on negligence."
Only one of the three alternative versions of § 2-318 deals with economic loss for remote
plaintiffs not in privity of contract with the defendant. This comment, therefore, must also be
applicable to parties that are in privity of contract.
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for article 2 makes no specific mention of3 a number of legal principles which
are routinely applied to sales contracts.2
The notion that tort recovery of economic loss in sales cases is inconsistent
with the scheme of article 2 of the U.C.C. is based on the idea that recognition of a cause of action in tort would undermine the allocation of the
risks relating to product performance by private agreement. This concern is
well justified with respect to extension of strict tort liability to economic
loss but not with respect to recognizing a cause of action in negligence.
3. Negligence and the Potential for Indefinite Liability
The third principal argument against permitting tort recovery for economic
loss in products cases is that such liability could be unforeseeable and
unlimited in scope.2 4 This concern, of course, is the basic concern behind
the broader rule, discussed in the first section of this article, that negligently
inflicted economic loss is not actionable in general. 35 That general rule,
however, is subject to a number of exceptions in circumstances where inherent
limitations on the class of potential plaintiffs eliminate the problem of
indefinite liability?236 One of the important exceptions exists where there is
some special relationship, such as a contractual relationship, between the
parties.? 7 Thus, in service contracts the general rule has not usually been
applied as between the immediate parties to the contract.? 8
In products cases, as in service transactions, there may be a problem of
unlimited liability where the parties are not in privity. A manufacturer may
negligently design a mass produced item which would then be sold through
numerous retail outlets. If the manufacturer is liable for economic loss
suffered by one ultimate purchaser it would seem he would be liable for the
losses of all.? 9 Those losses might in turn cause other losses to parties even

233. Promissory estoppel, restitution, mistake, fraud and misrepresentation are perhaps the
most common legal principles routinely applied to sales contracts even though not provided

for in article 2. See, e.g., Braud, Inc. v. White, 486 P.2d 50, 56 (Alaska 1971) ("[t]he Code
[U.C.C.] does not preclude the common law remedy of reformation for mutual mistake");
Prince v. LeVan, 486 P.2d 959 (Alaska 1971) (where specific provisions of U.C.C. article 2
apply to a transaction, they control and *displace any general principles of law that might be
applicable to the transaction; general legal principles supplement the U.C.C. only when no
codal provisions specifically apply to the issue); Saberton v. Greenwald, 146 Ohio St. 414, 66
N.E.2d 224 (1946) (provision in Uniform Sales Code similar to U.C.C. § 1-103 that in cases
not provided for, the rules relating to principal and agent and to the effect of fraud and
misrepresentation should continue to apply to sales of goods, allows an action ex delicto against

a seller who induces a sale by fraud or misrepresentation).
234. See supra note 174 and accompanying text.
235. See supra notes 79-97 and accompanying text.
236. See supra notes 88-93 and accompanying text.
237. See supra notes 37-58 and accompanying text.
238. See supra notes 191-204 and accompanying text.
239. Seely, 63 Cal. 2d at 17, 403 P.2d at 150, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 22.
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further removed from the manufacturer. If recovery is limited to parties in
privity, however, the problems of unlimited liability are largely avoided.m
The class of potential plaintiffs would have a specific and finite limit. The
limit would be the same as that in service contracts where courts have not
hesitated to impose liability. Concern that negligence liability for economic
loss in products cases would lead to problems of indefinite liability is simply
unwarranted so long as liability is limited to cases of custom-manufactured
goods.
CONCLUSION

Sales transactions and service transactions have traditionally been treated

differently under the law. Many sales transactions, nevertheless, involve
services as well as goods. In theory, it would be possible to apply sales law

to the goods element but not to the services element of such a mixed
transaction. The law, however, has not developed in that way. Instead,
courts determine whether the "essence of the transaction" is sale of goods,
or services, and then either apply article 2 to the entire transaction or to
none of it. 24 1

Whether article 2 applies to a particular transaction may be important for
a number of reasons. If article 2 applies and the seller is a merchant, the
U.C.C. imposes an implied warranty of merchantability. 242 No similar provision exists for service transactions. Nevertheless, many service transactions
involve goods as well as services. For example, the "services" of a beautician
may involve the "sale" of various beauty products.243 Twenty-five years ago
240. In some of the earlier negligence cases seeking recovery for economic losses, the courts
adverted to the absence of privity as at least one of the bases for denying the action. See, e.g.,
Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 1 Misc. 2d 477, 482, 148 N.Y.S.2d 284,
290 (Sup. Ct. 1955) ("[i]f the ultimate user were allowed to sue the manufacturer in negligence
merely because an article with latent defects turned out to be bad when used in 'regular service'
without any accident occurring, there would be nothing left of the citadel of privity"). More
recent cases, however, have eschewed privity as a dispositive factor in their denying a cause
of action in negligence. See, e.g., Clark, 99 Idaho at 336, 581 P.2d at 794 ("[rlather than
obscure fundamental tort concepts with contract notions of privity, we believe it is analytically
more useful to focus on the precise duty of care that the law of negligence, not the law of
contract or an agreement by the parties, has imposed on the defendant") (the court here denied
the negligence suit for economic loss on the grounds that no independent tort duty was owed
by defendant, and stressed that to impose negligence liability in this situation would undermine
the scheme of the U.C.C.); see also supra note 34.
241. See supra note 207.
242. U.C.C. § 2-314 (1977).
243. See, e.g., Epstein v. Giannattasio, 25 Conn. Supp. 109, 197 A.2d 342 (1963) (court
held that the transaction was in the nature of a service and that the use of the hair color
product in the course of the beauty treatment did not amount to a sale of goods under the
U.C.C.) (criticized in R. NonsTRoM, LAW

OF

SALEs 46-47 (1970)). The courts have taken

the same approach in suits involving transfusions of polluted blood, and have held that those
transactions involve services rather than sales. See, e.g., Lovett v. Emory Univ., 116 Ga. App.
277, 156 S.E.2d 923 (1967); Perlmutter v. Beth David Hosp., 308 N.Y. 100, 123 N.E.2d 792
(1954); R. NoRDsTRoM, supra, at 247-50.
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Professor Farnsworth pointed out that to say that a warranty is implied in
a sale does not necessarily mean that one is not implied if there is not a
sale. 244 Professor Farnsworth argued that in many transactions which are
not considered sales for purposes of article 2 there may be a sufficient,
though incidental, "sale" of goods to justify implication of a warranty of
quality with respect to those goods.2 5
To a large extent the argument made in this article is the converse of
Professor Farnsworth's argument. Just as many service transactions involve
a significant "sale of goods" element, many sales transactions involve a
significant "services" element. Just as implication of a warranty of quality
of goods should not artificially be limited to goods in transactions where the
transaction as a whole is governed by article 2, liability for negligent performance of services should not artificially be limited to transactions which,
as a whole, are not sales.
The economic loss rule as applied in products cases is designed to protect
the bargain of the parties, and in most instances the rule accomplishes this
purpose. However, due to the tendency of courts to categorize transactions
in their entirety as either sales or services, contracts calling for customdesigned and manufactured goods are often treated as sales even though
they require sophisticated design and engineering services. In this limited
context, the economic loss rule, rather than effectuating the agreement of
the parties, may actually undermine it.

244. Farnsworth, supra note 207.
245. Id. at 665-74.

